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A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the
preservation of the liberties and rights of the people,
it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to
establish and make suitable provision for the support
and maintenance of an efficient system of public free
schools. Article VII, Section 1, the Texas
Constitution
All free men, when they form a social compact, have
equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to
exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges,
but in consideration of public services. Article I,
Section 3, the Texas Constitution
The -Framers of the Texas Constitution clearly recog-
nized the necessity o-F public education in a democratic
society. Further, they recognized that special privilege was
incompatible with a democratic society. Despite the mandates
of the Constitution, public school finance in Texas has been,
and continues to be, inadequate for a large portion of the
state’s pupils. The methods of distributing state aid to
local districts has created low tax burdens for the taxpayers
of some districts and has imposed high tax burdens on others.
Districts with small, inadequate property tax bases are not
able to approach the levels of spending for education that
the wealthier portion of the state’s districts afford. The
state’s system of aid historically has maintained these two
2
injustices in clear violation of Article I, Section 3of the
state’s Constitution.
In the summer of 1984, Governor Mark White called
a special session of the 68th Legislature to address the
problems of public education in Texas and to deal with the
state’s needs for additional revenue. That session followed
a decade of fitful attempts at and retreats from substantive
reform of the methods of public school finance. In fact, the
comprehensive education reform bill that resulted from the
session. House Bill 72, was similar in its intent to the
comprehensive reform bill of 1975, House Bill 1126.
The -Finance portions o-F HB 72 have been the sub-
ject o-F controversy since the bill’s inception. In January
o-F 1985, the Legislature will be faced with the task of
adjusting the hastily passed HB 72. The narrow purpose of
this report is to provide a foundation for evaluating the
proposed adjustments to HB 72. The larger purpose is to
provide a basic understanding of the fundamentals of public
school finance. The report will present a normative model
against which school finance measures may be evaluated and
will use the model to critique education funding measures
3
since 1975. From the model and the critiques, the author
will present several recommendations for legislative action.
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
Chapter II is an historical overview of state aid
to public education in Texas. This history shows the incre-
mental movement toward an equitable school -Funding system.
Chapter 111 presents the basic concepts which apply to state
aid in a bifurcated school funding system. The normative
model is the subject of Chapter IV. That chapter sets out
goals for a state funding system and discusses implementation
of the goals. House Bill 72, the comprehensive school reform
bill of 1984 is evaluated in Chapter V. Chapter VI contains




A BRIEF HISTORY OF TEXAS STATE AID TO EDUCATION
Early Years
Texas was a -Frontier state. It had been a -Fron-
tier since the sixteenth century, and remained so until the
last quarter o-F the nineteenth century. When immigrants
moved west of the Trinity River or out of the lower Brazos
River plain they encountered a landscape out of the Late
Pleistocene Age. Extensive herds of grazing animals roamed
steppes and savannas, stalked by large predators and by
stone-age man. Immigrants adapted to this environment by
becoming horsemen and by adopting much of the culture of the
aborigines. They became Texans. Formal education was not a
high priority for frontiersmen living in such an environment.
Nor was it vital for the Neolithic—style agriculture and
horticulture that prevailed over much of the state during the
decades bracketing the Civil
The Texas Republic, possessed of abundant land and
large debts, attempted to finance public education exclusive-
ly through a permanent endowment of large tracts of land.
The grant consisted, initially, of 13,284 acres per county,
5
which the Congress of 1840 increased to 17,712 acres (three
leagues and four leagues, respectively). Each county was to
use its land "for the purpose of establishing a primary
school or academy in said county." None did so.""
The end of the Mexican War and the annexation of
Texas by the United States lead to the hope of security and
stability which encouraged a new wave of settlement. Since
public education had advanced in other states of the Union,
many immigrants expected and demanded a system of public
education in their new home. The Constitution of 1845,
adopted prior to annexation to the United States, stated that
the legislature should "establish free public schools
throughout the state, and...furnish means for their support,
by taxation of property."
w
Although the legislature complied
with the mandate to levy the tax, no funds were disbursed to
4
public schools.
Over the next one hundred years, Texas experienced
a civil war and a thirty-year—long guerrilla war on its
territory, and participated in two world wars. It moved from
a herding economy to an agrarian economy, then to an indus-
trial one. These events, which had impacts on the evolution
6
of public education in Texas receive more complete treatment
elsewhere. The general trend, however, was toward greater
state support of local educational efforts.
The early years left several legacies which would
prove important. After several false starts and failures,
the Permanent School Fund, a trust fund consisting, original-
ly, of land, reached significant proportions. The develop-
ment of the oil industry and the discovery of oil on School
Fund lands increased the revenues that the fund was capable
of producing.
By the end of the Second World War, the system of
education finance that was in place no longer met the needs
of the developing, industrializing state. Texas had over
5,000 school districts (compared to just over 1,000 today)
for a pupil population of 1.15 million. Many, if not the
majority of these districts were tax havens formed when
groups of taxpayers organized their own districts to avoid
the taxes of their old districts. Urban districts were
allowed to tax more heavily than rural districts. State aid
was distributed by a chaotic system of per capita distribu-
tion, categorical grants, and rural school aid. Finally,
Texas still had racially segregated districts.
7
During the 1920 s several academics had developed
models of public school finance systems to meet the needs of
the industrialized states. George D. Strayer and Robert M.
Haig, both long active in school finance studies for various
states developed the first modern school finance model for
New York State in a report entitled The Financing of Educa-
tion in the State of New York., published in Paul R.
Mortof Columbia University emerged as a leader in the
field, and continued to write through the 19305. These three




THE GILMER-AIKIN ERA 1949-1975
In a sequence of events reminiscent of those pre-
ceding the school reform session of 1984, an attempt to raise
teacher salaries resulted in a movement to reform the entire
education finance system. Senator A. M. Aikin and Represen-
tative Claud Gilmer sponsored legislation which resulted in
the appointment of a committee to study the public school
g
system of Texas. The Gilmer-Aikin report is entitled TO




The plan of school finance developed by Gilmer-
Aikin contained both old and new elements. Nonetheless, the
Gilmer-Aikin Laws moved Texas into the modern era of school
finance. The older elements included the Available School
Fund, an unequalized distribution of the revenues of the
state’s Permanent School Fund a trust fund. The new
elements which are relevant to this discussion are the Foun-
dation School Program and the County Economic Index. Since
these concepts continue, in one form or another, to be part
of the state system of school finance, they bear some brief
elaboration at this point.
THE MINIMUM FOUNDATION SCHOOL PROGRAM
The Foundation School Program is a device for com-
bining state and local support for education. Throughout the
era of the Gilmer—Aikin reforms it was called the ‘'Minimum
Foundation Program." The term "minimum" reflected the prin-
ciple that local districts could engage in discretionary
spending above the amounts determined by the basic program
and that the program was, in the words of the Committee, "the
very minimum kind of education
the citizens of Texas have
said they want."
10
Regardless of the name, most foundation
programs start with a
basic cost which may be assumed to be
9
the basic cost of education for the average or typical pupil.
The state and local shares of this cost are proportioned.
The local share is based on some judgement of what is reason-
able for the local district to raise from its own resources.
So far, in Texas the local share requirement has been low,
which has led to large state expenditures to affluent schools
due to the mechanics of the Foundation Program. The amount
of revenue that any school district raises above and beyond
its state-determined local share of the Foundation Program
cost becomes local enrichment, a subject which will be cov-
ered later. (See "Unequalized Local Enrichment" in Chapter
111. )
The advantage of the foundation program concept is
that it can achieve equalized spending among school districts
according to criteria which are easily understood. Properly
designed foundation programs also contribute to efficiency in
the spending of state money since less aid goes to school
districts which have adequate local revenue capacity. As
this report will show, foundation programs can achieve such
worthy results only under certain conditions.
The Local Fund Assignment and State Share are the
divisions of the Foundation School Program entitlement (FSP)
10
of any particular district. The Local Fund Assignment (LFA)
is an amount calculated on the basis of the district’s reve-
nue capacity. Since the Foundation Program entitlement is a
fixed amount for any particular district at any particular
time, the remainder left when the LFA is subtracted from the
FSP is the state’s share or the amount of state aid. The LFA
is an important concept since it is the basis of the state
aid calculation, and is subject to misconceptions and misin-
terpretati ons.
The Gilmer—Aikin Committee recommended that the
Local Fund Assignment would be the revenue raised by applying
a tax rate of 15 cents per $lOO valuation to the taxable
property of each district. On the average that gave a
state/local share ratio of between 80/20 and 75/25.Di s-
tricts which had less than average taxable property would
pay a smaller proportion, and wealthier districts would pay
a larger proportion. On the surface, Gilmer-Aikin should
have achieved a significant amount of equalization. In
practice, the equalizing effects were offset by the small
amount which the Minimum Foundation Program provided as the
basic cost of education, by the size of the per capita, non-
weal th—tested Available School Fund grants, by an inadequate
measurement of district wealth, and by several accomodations
11
for wealthy
The state of property tax appraisal in Texas at
the time the Gilmer—Aikin laws were written was chaotic. The
Gilmer—Aikin Committee realized that the idea of applying a
tax rate to the property value within a school district in
order to calculate the LFA and State Share had no meaning in
a system of locally determined percentage assessments of
property. To get around this problem, the Committee settled
on a complicated County Economic Index by which to determine
the Local Fund Assignment. The index was meant to measure
local economic activity not necessarily local tax capaci-
ty. It was a cumbersome device made necessary by the inade-
quacy of other institutional arrangements. By the late
19605, the designers of the County Economic Index had become
its worst critics. Dr. Edgar Morphet, one of the designers
of the Index stated:
The Economic Index approach to evaluating local ability
offers a |i.ttle better measure than sheer chance, but
not much.
w
CAUTIONS ILLUSTRATED BY THE GILMER-AIKIN LAWS
Rational systems of school funding are neither
secret nor unknown. Fair and equitable school funding is a
12
simple process which is impeded by several methods and
motives:
1. Complexity can hide a multitude o-F sins, and prevent
effective oversight by the non—mathematical. The
Bartlett Study, commissioned by the Connally Commission
reported that, "complexity is one o-F the major -faults
o-F the Economic Index.... Texas distributes more than
$6OO million in state school aid annually according to
14
a system which almost defies comprehension."
2. Institutional arrangements may prevent implementation
of an effective, efficient finance structure. A true
and effective foundation program was not possible be-
fore the state required 100% assessment of property.
Percentage assessment was an institution that pre-
vented change.
3. Vested Interests. Changes in funding create winners
and losers. Reforms are accompanied, sometimes, by
attempts to prevent any district from losing state aid
regardless of need. The vested interests in this case
are parents and/or taxpayers in wealthy districts. The
extra state aid subsidizes lower tax rates and/or af-
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fluent schools in such districts. The money to provide
that benefit comes from the average and poor schools
and from the state’s taxpayers.
Although the Gilmer-Aikin Laws were a positive
advance for a state which had not made any advances in ra-
tional or effective aid to education, it must be remembered
that the major descriptions of foundation programs date from
the 1920’s and 1930’5. By the 1930’s some form of foundation
program was in wide use in other states. At the same time,
the work of the committee should not be discounted. Many of
the committee’s recommendations to improve the equity and
efficiency of state aid to public education have not been
implemented, despite reiteration over the years. For exam-
ple, the Connally Commission observed that the Gilmer-Aikin
Laws, as passed and despite the efforts of its sponsors, did
not encourage consolidation of inefficient school dis-
. . . 16
tricts.
The Connally Commission Report - 1968
The Gilmer-Aikin Laws produced improvements in
school finance, but by the middle 1960 s the inadequacies
discussed above had become apparent. Senate Bill 4, passed
by the 59th Legislature in 1965, established a Governor’s
14
Committee on Public School Education with a broad mandate to
conduct "a pervasive inquiry into every facet of Texas public
elementary and secondary Governor John
Connally appointed Houston attorney Leon Jaworski to chair
the committee and to produce a report by 1968.
The Connally Commission Report became a massive,
seven-volume work which did, in fact, explore "every facet"
of public education in Texas. After intensive study of the
existing structure of school finance, the Commission made a
number of recommendations which were in basic accord with the
principles of school finance equity espoused by Gilmer-Aikin.
The report, entitled The Challenge and The Chance, recommen-
ded :
1. An expanded foundation program that would be a more
realistic reflection of true educational costs.
2. A Local Fund Assignment based on the market value of
property within each school district. To provide this
information, the Committee recommended that the state
establish a Documentary Stamp Tax to provide assessment
sales ratio data.
3. A Local Fund Assignment of 20 cents per $lOO valuation
in 1969-70, rising to 30 cents by 1979-80. (This is a
15
large Local Fund Assignment compared to actual practice
until 1984.)
4. Reduction of the Available School Fund (the non—wealth-
tested part of state aid) by redirecting dedicated
revenues from the ASF to the Foundation School Fund.
The report made a number of other recommendations
concerning consolidation of small districts, pupi 1/teacher
ratios, and administration, but the ones noted are those
18
immediately relevant to the finance issue.
The legislature failed to act on the Committee’s
recommendati ons.
Ihe Rodriguez Case -- 1973
In 1972, U.S. District Count -found the Texas
method o-f distributing state aid to be unconstitutional in a
case called Rodriquez v. San Antonio Independent School
District. The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court on
appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the earlier decision
reluctantly, and called the state’s method o-f financing
19
education "chaotic and unjust.” The Court found, however,
that it could not rule the system unconstitutional on the
grounds sought.
16
House Bill 1126 -- 1975
In response to the threat of successful legal ac-
tion, in 1975 the 64th Legislature passed House Bill 1126.
This measure made significant changes in the methods of
school finance, and included many of the recommendations
which the Connally Commission had made in 1968 and which the
Gilmer-Aikin Committee had made in 1949. This bill repre-
sents the end of the era of the Gilmer-Aikin laws. It is not
the end of the era of Gilmer and Aikin. Senator Aikin’s
influence, in particular, is still felt in Texas public
education. The failings of the Gilmer-Aikin Laws should not
reflect on Senator Aikin, however much his name is associated
with them. To repeat, the laws, as they were passed, did not
implement the recommendations of the Gilmer—Aikin Report.
H.8.1126 made the following changes in the school finance
system:
1. Equal 2zation Gid provided an additional grant to
schools with wealth per pupil less than 120 percent of
the state average.
2. The bill renamed the Minimum Foundation School Program
the Foundation School Program. The name change had two
conflicting messages; it implied either that the pro-
17
gram now represented largess of funding, or that the
state had finally dropped the pretense that the Minimum
Foundation Program represented the minimum adequate
level of funding.
3. The Local Fund Assignment was to be calculated on each
district’s actual market value of property.
4. The tax rate for the Local Fund Assignment was set at
30 cents per $lOO valuation for 1975-76 and 35 cents
thereafter.
5. Section 16.001 of the Education Code was amended to
state clearly that it was now state policy that "each
student...shall have access to programs and services
that are appropriate to his educational needs and that
are substantially equal to those available to any simi-
lar student, notwithstanding varying local economic
factors."
The results of H.8.1126 were debatable. On the
surface, it represented a major reform, but several studies




Senate Bill 1 1977
The controversy that followed H.B. 1126 resulted
in attempts to "adjust" the bill in every following legisla-
ture. Senate Bill 1 in 1977 was one such adjustment.
1. The Local Fund Assignment (LFA) was reduced from 35
cents per $lOO valuation to 18 cents. Reducing the LFA
is a common reaction of the legislature, As this
report repeatedly shows, LFA reduction is not appro-
priate. The reduction of the LFA caused a large reduc-
tion in the equalizing effect of the program. To
offset the losses which the below-average-weal th
schools would have experienced, the total appropriation
for the Foundation School Program was increased. The
largest part of the increase went to schools of above
average wealth.
2. The scope of the Foundation School Program was in-
creased to include special and vocational education
which heretofore had been categorical grants. The
state aid attributable to these programs became wealth-
tested. This was an improvement over the previous prac-
tice of giving this aid as categorical grants, but the
net effect of S.B. 1 was disequalizing. The reduced
Local Fund Assignment probably eliminated any improve-
ments that the larger program would have produced.
19
An analysis by Sunderman and Hineley showed that
S.B. 1 resulted in disequalization; the wealthiest dis-
tricts received larger increases in aid than the poorest
districts.
Senate Bill 350 -- 1979
5.8.350 repeated the trends of 5.8.1. Passed in
1979;, it lowered the LFA to 15 cents, with a corresponding
reduction in the equalization effect of the finance formulas.
The bill added two provisions to shield wealthy schools from
the equalizing effects of the Foundation School Program for—
mul a:
1. MinintLiD sid was a guarantee that no district would
receive less state aid per pupil than in some previous
year, regardless of the district’s current economic
situation. Prior to the passage of H.8.72, the 1980-81
school year was the benchmark.
2. Hold-haraless clauses guaranteed that no district’s
Local Fund Assignment could exceed its previous year’s
Local Fund Assignment by more than 120 percent. Under
this provision, a district which became wealthy, or
gained a larger tax base, was protected from
20
corresponding reductions in state aid. The reader
should remember that if a district’s wealth per pupil
doubles, the district can raise the same amount of
money per pupil as it did before with half the tax
rate. Conversely, with the same tax rate, it can raise
twice as much money. Hold-harmless provisions ensure
that such districts are protected against drops in
state aid. The same argument applies to minimum aid.
The bill reduced the Local Fund Assignment from 18
cents to 15 cents which, again, reduced the equalizing effect
of the Foundation School Program. In defense of the 66th
Legislature, passage of the major property tax reform bills
during that session raised serious questions about the fiscal
security of the state’s school districts. The ultimate im-
pact of the agriculture productivity and homestead exemp-
tions, as well as 100 percent appraisal of property, were
unknown- The bill’s education finance provisions were inten-
ded to mitigate the effects of the property tax reforms.
Senate Bill 621 -- 1979
With the passage of S.B. 621 in 1979, Texas, for
the first time, had a system by which to evaluate local
revenue capacity for effective and efficient allocation of
21
state aid. The bill reformed property tax practices, man-
dated 100 percent assessment, and reorganized the administra-
tion of the property tax.
House Bill 246 -- 1981
H.8.246 in 1981 had indirect implications for
school funding. It mandated an expanded and uniform state-
wide curriculum. Schools which were not in substantial con-
formance faced the expense of conformance by 1985. Since the
schools that were less likely to be in conformance tended to
be less wealthy, H.8.246 increased the pressure on the legis-
lature to pass further finance reforms.
House Bill 72 — 1984
By the first session of the 68th Legislature in
1983, public awareness of the problems of public education
was at a high point. There was considerable pressure to
increase teachers’ salaries as well. The House of Represen-
tatives refused to act without current information. In re-
sponse, Governor Mark White appointed the Select Committee
on Public Education (5.C.0.P.E.), chaired by Dallas
businessman H. Ross Perot. The SCOPE Committee created
considerable controversy by challenging many of the institu-
22
tions and conventions which had come to characterize public
education in Texas. The finance reforms, however, were not
substantially different from those recommended by the
Connally Commission in 1968, although they differed in ap-
pearance since the context of education had changed.
The SCOPE recommendations, which would have pro-
duced a truly just, efficient, and effective school finance
system, were compromised to produce Senate Bill 4. The House
produced H.8.72 with additional compromises. The Senate-
House Conference Committee produced the final version of
H.8.72. H.8.72 is the subject of a later chapter, but a
brief listing of its finance provisions follows:
1. The concept of equalizing school funding within the
context of the Foundation Program was expanded.
2. State aid distribution was based on pupil population
(average daily attendance) rather than teaching staff
(personnel units).
3. The Foundation School Program was expanded to conform
more closely to the true accountable costs of educa-
tion, and a process was instituted to apprise the
legislature of changes in accountable costs.
23
4. The Local Fund Assignment was calculated by a different
method. Previously, the Local Fund Assignment was cal-
culated as the amount of revenue that would be produced
by a uniform tax rate on a particular district’s tax
base. Under H.8.72, the average district’s Local Fund
Assignment is set at 30 percent of its total Foundation
School Program grant in the first year and 33 percent
thereafter. A wealth-test formula alters this propor—
tion for each district so that the state share is a
larger proportion for poorer districts and a smaller
proportion for wealthier districts. At a district
wealth of 330 percent of the state average wealth,
districts are no longer eligible for aid from the
Foundation Program Fund in the first year. Thereafter,
eligibility stops at 300 percent of the state average
wealth. A transition fund protects districts above
these limits from abrupt losses of aid over a period of
three years.
5. The bill introduced a Price Differential Index which
adjusts the per—pupil allotment of each district for
uncontrollable cost factors such as highly competitive
job markets which increase salary demands for qualified
teachers.
24
Table ll—l compares the major features of the
finance portion of H.B. 72 to the system which preceded it.
H.8.72 was the most thoroughgoing finance reform of
the decade, and represents a potentially durable structure
for further reform in school finance. The bill did not
accomplish the sweeping reforms envisioned by the SCOPE Com-
mittee, nor did it reach the goals set by the Connally
Committee. The remainder of this paper will deal with the
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Chapter III
BASIC CONCEPTS IN SCHOOL FINANCE
This chapter will deal with the problems of a
bifurcated system of school funding. The issues in
question are a) the cost of a basic, quality education,
b) local tax capacity, c) local tax effort, and d) the
foundation school program concept. This chapter does
not deal with possible solutions to the issues raised,
which appear in Chapter IV.
The Texas Constitution states that "it is the duty
of the legislature...to establish and make suitable provi-
sion for the support and maintenance of an efficient system
of public free schools." Texas Constitution, Art. VII,
Sec. 1. Within that mandate there are three mechanisms
which the state could use:
1. The state may grant taxing authority to school dis-
tricts. The Constitution does not require more than
that. Provided that every district in the state had
the same taxing capacity per pupil, this system would
not create large differences in the capability of dis-
tricts to support education.
2. The state may become the sole source
of school funding
and can prevent local districts from levying any tax.
3. The state may share responsibility for local school
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finance with the local districts.
Texas uses the third system. The division of
responsibility between the state and local districts is
called a "bifurcated funding system." An important legal
concept related to school finance is that school districts
are the creatures of the state. The state authorizes their
creation and grants them the power to tax and to incur debt
Tx. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 3. The power to tax is
the critical point. By granting school districts the power
to tax, the state has allowed them to act in a surrogate
capacity for the state. The grant of taxing power is a
of money. The problem of equalization arises because
the grants of taxing power to school districts are not
equivalent. Therefore, Texas has rich and poor districts by
the choice of the state.
1
Each of the systems described above requires a
different level of state responsibility. The first is a
laizez faire approach which leaves the determination of
educational needs and local tax effort more or less up to
the local district. It assumes that the quality of educa-
tion that a child deserves is that which the voters of his
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or her district are willing and able to support. Total state
funding, on the other hand, requires that the state deter—
mine the quality of education needed, calculate the cost of
that education, and appropriate the necessary funds. The
state can fund such a program from regular state revenues,
or it can maintain a state-col lected ad valorem tax that
substitutes for and replaces the local property tax.
The bi-Furcated system requires estimates o-F basic
program cost, also, but further requires an estimate of the
revenue capacity of the local district. The reason for this
may be seen in two extreme cases. A district with no prop-
erty wealth would be financed completely by the state. In
such a case, it would be necessary to know the appropriate
level of funding. Conversely, an extremely wealthy district
might be capable of meeting all of its educational needs
with minimal tax effort. It is not logical that the state
should subsidize education in such a district, given the
fact that the state does not have an unlimited amount of
money. In this case, the need is to determine a reasonable
local share. In any case, it is neither logical nor effi-
cient to reduce the ability of an average or poor district
to provide an adequate education in order to subsidize
education in districts with adequate resources.
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The responsibility of the state is clear, not only
-From the mandates within the Constitution, but also From
statute. The Education Code states, "each student...shal 1
have access to programs and services that are appropriate to
his or her educational needs and that are substantially
equal to those available to any similar student, notwith-
standing varying local economic -Factors. The two princi-
ples that are the subject of the present discussion are
that equivalent pupils shall receive equivalent educational
opportunities and that local economic factors should have no
bearing on a pupil’s educational opportunities.
Understanding school finance requires understand-
ing the factors which make up school funding in a bifurcated
system. A discussion of the basic factors follows.
LOCAL TAX CAPACITY
The primary source of unequal educational funding
is the variation in local property wealth among Texas school
districts. The secondary reason is the willingness of local
taxpayers to support education. The variation in wealth
results in variation in tax effort and in the productivity
of school district taxes. The variation in capacity makes
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the horizontal equity of school district taxation in Texas
remarkably poor. Horizontal equity occurs when equals are
treated equally. For example, when the owners of equivalent
property in two school districts pay the same amount of tax,
horizontal tax equity exists between those two property
owners. To the degree that they do not pay the same amount
of tax, it does not. Horizontal equity can refer, also, to
things other than taxes for example, to the educational
opportunity of school children. When equivalent children
receive equivalent educational oportunity, that is horizon-
tal equity in education."'
The magnitude of wealth variation in Texas is worth
a closer look. The wealthiest district has over 600 times
the wealth per pupil of the poorest district and over 60
4
times the wealth per pupil of the average district. Wealth
variations of this magnitude have two consequences. First,
little equity exists betweeen the taxpayers in different
school districts. Second, the capability of districts to
support adequate educational programs varies. Unless state
aid compensates fully for the lack of capacity, the children
of the poorer districts will receive neither adequate nor
equivalent educations.
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Legislation can affect tax capacity in a number of
ways. By removing property from the tax roles, property tax
exemptions reduce the revenue capacity of school districts.
In order to recover the lost revenue, districts are forced
to increase taxes on nonexempt property. The impact of
exemptions may vary between districts. Agricultural land is
an important component in the tax bases of some districts
while residential property is more important in other dis-
tricts. Within the wealth ranges in which the equalization
and foundation programs operate, districts may receive more
state aid as the result of relative losses of wealth. How-
ever, the mechanisms needed to prevent a tax burden shift
are complex, and will not be addressed here. Suffice it to
say that, if the state replaces the revenues lost to dis-
tricts through property tax exemptions, demands on the state
treasury increase.
LOCAL TAX EFFORT AND PRODUCTIVITY
Variations in local tax capacity relate directly to
tax effort. In order to raise the same revenue per pupil as
the wealthiest district, the average district would have to
have a tax rate 60 times as high as the wealthiest dis-
trict. Conversely, were both districts to raise some arbi-
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trary amount, for example, SIOOO per pupil, the average
district would have to have a tax rate of 43 cents per SIOO
valuation, but the wealthiest district would have a rate of
only 7/10 of a cent per SIOO valuation. This variation
exists in the more common wealth ranges, also. A district
with three times the statewide average in property value per
pupil can raise three times the revenue of the average
district with the same tax rate. Conversely, it can raise
the same revenue with one third the tax rate.
Figure 111-l indicates the variation in revenue
capacity. The horizontal axis shows district wealth per
pupil. The vertical axis shows the amount of revenue raised
in dollars per pupil if all districts had a tax rate of 58
cents per $lOO valuation, which is close to the current
statewide average. The chart shows the one-to-one relation-
ship between wealth and capacity. The average district has
twice the capacity of the district with one-half the wealth
and one-half the capacity of the district with twice the
average wealth.
If the wealthiest district in the state were to
levy a tax of 58 cents per $lOO valuation, it would raise
$Bl,OOO per pupil. The majority of wealthy districts, how-
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Revenue capacity increases as wealth increases. On any given tax
rate, as property wealth doubles, revenue capacity doubles. Figure 111-l
shows the revenue capacity of school districts at the average tax rate of
58 cents per $lOO valuation. The wealthiest district had about 75 times
the revenue capacity of the average district, and 467 times the capacity
of the poorest district in 1981. The current average wealth is about
$220,000. The majority of "wealthy" districts fall far below the wealth-
iest district, and tend to cluster between $750,000 and $3,000,000 per
pupil.
Source: Texas Education Agency, "Rank Order of 1981 Index 2 Value Per
ADA" (Austin: Texas Education Agency, January 18, 1983) and "Fiscal Impact
Model, H.B. 72 Conference Committee Report"(TEA, June 28, 1984).
Figure 111-l
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ever, enjoy low tax rates, since low rates will provide
adequate revenue. For example, the wealthiest districts can
raise $5OOO to $6OOO per pupil with a five cent tax rate.
The variation in property wealth produces either
inequity in taxation, inequity in school spending, or both.
If a wealthy district has a tax rate near the state average,
its taxpayers will be treated about the same as the taxpay-
ers in other school districts, but its school district will
enjoy revenues many times higher than the average-wealth
district.
If the wealthy district opts for an average level
of school funding, its taxpayers enjoy tax rates many times
lower than the taxpayers of the average-wealth district, all
things being equal. In fact, the correlation between tax
rate and property wealth is low. Calculations by the Texas
Education Agency find it to be a negative 0.27 which means
that there is a slight tendency for districts with large tax
bases to choose low tax rates. 6 This means that many wealthy
districts choose to finance their school programs well rather
than to have low tax rates. Several districts levy over
$9,000 per year per pupil. This does not mean that horizontal
tax equity is not a problem in Texas, but that the pattern of
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low wealth with high taxes and high wealth with low taxes is
not uniform, statewide. The problem still exists. The tax
rate for maintenance and operations varies from 5 cents per
SIOO valuation to $1.25 per SIOO valuation.
7
That means that
owners of equivalent property in different districts bear
different tax burdens. This condition is horizontal inequity
of taxation.
THE ACCOUNTABLE COSTS OF EDUCATION
Accountable cost determinations are the sine qua
non of any effective foundation program system. Foundation
programs are based on state/local sharing of the costs of
education, and the state/local share of the foundation pro-
gram is dependent on the true total costs of an accredited
program. Figure 111-2 compares a large foundation program
with a small program. The larger foundation program one
which recognizes the true, total, or accountable cost of
education provides more aid to the school district. If
the foundation program size is too small the district’s
total true share is large, since the district must pay for
8
the balance of its necessary costs from its own resources.
Unfortunately, the task of accurately determining the true
cost of education is usually ignored.
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When the Foundation School Program is smaller than the true cost
of education, school districts are forced to cover the balance of the
cost from local resources. The Local Fund Assignment (LFA) in the
small FSP is only 12 percent of the FSP amount, but that is only 2
percent of the total cost of education for the district. The district
is forced to pick up an additional 45 percent of the total cost. Under
the full-sized FSP, one which covers the total cost of education, an
LFA of 30 percent produces a smaller total local share.
*The LFA is 12 percent of the FSP, but 2 percent of the total cost.
Source: The proportions of the state/local share for the small FSP are
the author's calculations from the Texas Research League, Benchmarks
for 1984-85 School District Budgets in Texas (Austin: Texas Research
League, 1984), pp. 2, 16.
Figure 111-2
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The cost of education varies according to the
special needs of any particular pupil. This is recognized
in Section 16.001 of the Education Code. "Accountable cost"
may refer to either the accountable cost of an accredited
education, or to the accountable cost of a normative educa-
tion. An accredited education is one which meets the
state’s accreditation standards. A normative education is
one which reflects the sort of education which the majority
of districts consider desirable. The normative education
exceeds the accredited education. For example, classroom
computer use is coming to be considered "normal" and neces-
sary. The accreditation standards do not recognize the need
for computer literacy.
The difficulty of estimating either type of ac-
countable cost lies in estimating the true cost for dif-
ferent pupils. The task is complicated by several factors.
The largest cost in education is for teacher salaries.
Teacher salaries and pupil-teacher ratios vary widely among
Texas school districts because of the wide differences in
spending that occur. Local pri vate-sector job markets and
competition among school districts for quality teachers may
increase teacher salaries in some districts but not in
others, causing variation in the accountable costs that
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different districts face. Extremely poor districts may
push the average cost down by cutting back on programs.
Small school districts have poor economies of scale, and
districts in sparsely settled regions have additional sup-
port costs, so their costs are increased by a special set of
factors. Finally, special interest groups, especially those
involved in extracurricular activities, may drive costs up
statewide by insisting on inclusion of their activities in
the school program. In short, simple average costs are a
poor guide to basic accountable costs. On the other hand,
the cost of the accredited program alone may be too low.
The accredited program does not recognize the need for
classroom computer utilization. Yet classroom computers are
becoming the norm. For all these reasons, the basic ac-
countable cost should start with the cost of an accredited
program, but should include the costs considered normative
for a basic quality education.
Detailed discussion of the methods -For determining
accountable costs is beyond the scope of this paper. House
Bill 72 of the 68th Legislature required the appointment of
a committee to develop a methodology to determine account-
able costs, but no action has been taken as of this writing.
The Texas Education Agency has expressed reluctance to ful-
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fill this mandate of H.B. 72.
There are two methods for determining the basic
accountable cost of education. The first is an econometric
study to isolate the cost factors independent of local
choice, local tax capacity, and local uncontrollable costs.
This is similar to the method for determining the Price
Differential Index (discussed later). The second method is
the Basic Cost Model, which is an a priori accounting of the
factors which make up educational costs. According to Dr.
Richard Hooker, professor of school finance at the Univef—
sity of Houston, this is the most reliable and the simplest
method.
Accountable costs are a controversial political
issue, since the basic accountable cost is considered to be
the proper size of the basic state aid grant, or the Founda-
tion School Program Allotment per pupil (terms which are
self-explanatory, but will be defined more closely later).
The accountable cost that is chosen carries several messages
and has several consequences:
1. The accountable cost figure may be considered the cost
of an adequate education. State policymakers can claim
to have appropriated sufficient money to support public
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schools without additional local taxes, and local tax
opponents can argue that additional taxes are not
needed, since the state has provided sufficient funds.
If the accountable cost is adequate, all of this may be
true, but when accountable costs are inadequate, addi-
tional money will be needed. Then the public is de-
ceived, local tax rates may rise, or the educational
opportunity available to the district’s pupils will be
compromi sed.
2. The equalizing effects of the Foundation School Program
are reduced as the size of the accountable cost drops
relative to true costs. This is apparent when one
considers that the smaller FSP means, also, that the
amount of equalized state aid becomes a smaller portion
of the total cost of education in any particular dis-
trict. Refer to Figure lII—4- Since tax capacity va-
ries so radically among districts, the smaller ac-
countable cost figure means that a smaller portion of
the total finance system is equalized.
Ultimately, the smaller accountable cost figure means a
less-than-adequate education for the pupils living in
property-poor school districts.
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-■ Larger than realistic accountable cost figures may lead
to inefficiency. Since aid to public education is the
largest single cost to state government in Texas, a
little inefficiency has a large impact.
4. Larger accountable cost figures, in general, mean more
cost to the state. That means higher state taxes.
Given the traditional reluctance of the Texas legisla-
ture to raise taxes, the pressure to develop smaller
cost figures is considerable.
5. Larger accountable costs can reduce local property
taxes, since state aid can displace local revenue
needs.
Regardless of the technique used to determine ac-
countable costs, as a rule of thumb, normative costs will be
larger than accredited costs. If accredited costs are used
as the basis for establishing the Foundation School Program
size, the final amount used should be be larger than the
estimates of accredited costs indicate since the aspirations
of parents and school districts will tend to encourage in-
creases in local program size above the level determined to
be reasonable by the state, unless, indeed, the state level
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is obviously adequate. The discussion above used the example
of classroom computer use as a cost of education which is
becoming normative, although it is not recognized in the
state’s accreditation standards. H.B. 72 requires the Texas
Education Agency to develop estimates of the accountable
costs of an accredited education. The legislature should
consider either extending accreditation standards to ensure
that they are truly adequate, or using normative costs as the
standard for the estimates of Foundation School Program size.
THE FOUNDATION PROGRAM CONCEPT
A foundation program, in general, is a structure
for balancing state and local effort in systems that permit
independent local taxation. There are several types of
foundation programs, but all are variations on a theme.
Any equalizing foundation program balances state
aid against local capacity to provide the basic program.
This is the critical point. Local capacity is granted by
the state. The local district is acting as a surrogate
taxing authority for the state. By making the state respon-
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sible for education, Texas law mandates that state aid
compensate for inadequate local capacity.
As Figure 111-l showed, local revenue capacity is a
function of the wealth of any district. Figure 111-3 shows
local revenue capacity balanced by state aid. The vertical
axis indicates dollars per pupil. The horizontal axis shows
local taxable wealth per pupil. The diagonal line indicates
how revenue capacity increases as wealth increases, as it
did in Figure 111-l. The basic cost line indicates the
basic cost of education, the accountable cost. If a dis-
trict had no taxable wealth, state aid would comprise 100
percent of the district’s funding. At some point, as local
wealth increases, local revenue begins to comprise 100 per-
cent of the district’s funding. Such a system meets the
requirements of Texas law Brovided_that_the_
figyre chgsen_actually_accgrds_with_real_cgsts.
Figure 111-4 shows what happens when the chosen
accountable cost figure is too small. Districts in Range A
are unable to provide sufficient revenue to cover the basic
cost of education without higher—than-average tax rates, so
the system fails to comply with the equity mandates of Texas
1 aw.
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An equitable system of school finance uses state aid to balance
local revenue capacity exactly. Within the range covered by state aid
in the figure, all school districts would have a combination of revenues
sufficient to provide a basic education, provided that the amount of
state aid for the poorest district was adequate.
Source: This is a schematic representation of the revenue-balancing effect
of any Foundation School Program that compensates fully for inade-
quate local capacity. By the author.
Figure 111-3
Balancing Local Revenue Capacity With State Aid
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When the state fails to recognize the true total cost of education
by underfunding the Foundation School Program, districts in Range A, which
contains the majority of the state's districts and pupils, are forced to
underfund their schools or to levy higher-than-average tax rates. Dis-
tricts in Range B are able to exceed the necessary funding level with
lower-than-average tax rates. Therefore, underfunding the FSP creates
horizontal inequities in both taxation and education.
The figure is a simplification of the situation, since it shows
only the result of underfunding a program with an equitable aid distribu-
tion, as indicated by the horizontal state aid distribution line. In
reality, the distribution of state aid is not equitable. That is the
subject of later discussions. The sole purpose of the figure is to show
what happens when any Foundation School Program is underfunded.
Source: Schematic representation by the author.
Figure 111-4
The Result of Underfunding
The Foundation School Program
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Foundation programs can be devised which provide
different distribution patterns. Figure 111-5 shows the
distribution pattern prior to the passage of H.B. 72. The
combination of state and local revenue ensured that dis-
tricts with less wealth had less to spend. Figure 111-6
shows the results of H.B. 72. The situation improved, but
neither the former system nor H.B. 72 provided an adequate
balance of state and local revenue.
THE LOCAL SHARE IN THE FOUNDATION PROGRAM
Foundation programs calculate the local share for
the purpose of determining how much state aid each district
will receive. In Texas, districts are not required actually
to raise their local share.
The local share can be based on either a tax rate
applied to the local tax base or a percentage of the total
Foundation aid. For example, in 1983-84, the tax rate for
the LFA was 11 cents per $lOO valuation of taxable property.
A district of average wealth would have raised $186,000/100
X .11 = $204.60. Subtracting that amount from the district’s
Foundation School Program entitlement (which varied accord-
ing to district characteristics) produced the amount of
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Figure 111-5 is a simplified view of the distribution of aid prior
to H.B. 72. FSP aid and Available School Fund money went to districts
with enormous local capacity. The equalizing or revenue balancing effect
of the Foundation School Program was minimal. Equalization aid was a
pittance. The figure ignores minimum aid, hold-harmless provisions,
textbook aid, and the state teacher retirement contribution, all of which
favored the wealthier districts. It does not show how the FSP amount to
which districts were entitled varied. In reality, the distribution looks
like a collection of 1,069 points with a tendency to fit the lines shown.
Source: Author's calculations based on the school finance statutes prior
to H.B. 72, with reference to "Fiscal Impact Model, H.B. 72 -- Committee
Amendments" (Austin: Texas Education Agency, June 18, 1984), p. 2.
Figure 111-5
Total Revenue Distribution Prior To H.B. 72
50
Under H.B. 72, Foundation School Program aid no longer goes to dis-
tricts with over 330 percent of the average wealth per pupil. Beginning
in 1985-86, aid will stop at 300 percent of the average wealth. Enrich-
ment Equalization aid produces a flat, balanced distribution up to 110
percent of the average wealth. Thereafter, the distribution is less ef-
ficient; state aid and the state grant of revenue capacity continues to
give wealthy districts the advantage over poor and average districts.
This system, however, is superior in this regard to the previous system
illustrated by Figure 111-5.
Source: "Fiscal Impact Model , H.B. 72 -- Conference Committee Report"
(Austin: Texas Education Agency, June 28, 1984), p. 2.
Figure 111-6
Distribution of Revenue Under H.B. 72
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state aid that the district would receive. Under H.B. 72, a
percentage LFA system, the average-weal th district is re-
sponsible for 30 percent of its Foundation School Program
amount, but districts above and below the average wealth are
responsible for a greater or smaller percentage, respective-
ly- The LFA of a district with one—half of the average
wealth would be 1/2 X .30 X FSP amount. The formula actually
used in H.B. 72 is somewhat different but the dollar effect
is the same.
The local share interacts with the basic cost to
produce the distribution of state aid. Figure 111-7 shows
the distributions produced by two local share levels with the
same total state spending. The smaller local share includes
more districts in the distribution of aid. The smaller share
reduces the amount of aid per pupil relative to the amount
provided by a larger local share, since the total state
appropriation is limited, and the smaller local share is more
expensive to the state. In other words, the smaller local
share represents property tax relief for districts at the
wealthy end of the spectrum, but increases the property tax
requirements of districts at the less affluent end of the
spectrum.
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Given a limit on the total amount that the state is willing to ap-
propriate for education, the size of the Local Fund Assignment is criti-
cal. It determines the amount of the FSP allotment per pupil, how many
pupils and districts will receive FSP aid, and the amounts they will re-
ceive. It determines also the equity of the state aid distribution. Fig-
ure 111-7 uses a different base-line, property wealth per pupil by pupil ,
instead of by district. Using this base, the FSP allotment for the aver-
age pupil is always the same, given that the total state appropriation to
the FSP remains the same. Line Ais produced by a large LFA. The large
LFA results in the largest FSP allotment per pupil, but fewer pupils will
reside in districts which receive aid. Line B is produced by a small LFA.
The small LFA results in a small FSP allotment per pupil, since aid goes
to more pupils. The larger LFA produces a more equalizing distribution of
state aid, since the aid balances local revenue capacity.
Source: Author's calculations.
Figure 111-7
The Influence of the Local Fund Assignment
On the Equity of State Aid Distribution
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The local share should be an accurate reflection of
the tax rate considered appropriate by the majority of
school districts close to the average local tax rate.
When the local share is below this, the cost of the program
increases. The danger is that the state will lower its
estimate of the basic cost in order to keep the total cost
within an acceptable level, and lower the LFA to distribute
state aid to more districts. The net result is that the
program will fail to provide an adequate education to the
pupils of less affluent districts. This has been the prac-
tice of the state in the past. The only reasonable course
is for the state to set the basic cost figure at an ade-
quate, even generous, level, since failure to do so results
in increased property tax burdens for all but the affluent
districts and inadequate educational opportunity in the less
affluent districts.
If uniformity of taxation is a worthy goal, then
the foundation program should require a "reasonable" effort
that reflects what most communities have determined to be
"reasonable," i.e., near the average tax rate. Any school
district that cannot meet the basic cost without a higher
tax effort deserves state aid. Reducing the importance of
the local property tax in such a system is possible by
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increasing the size of the FSP, which means increasing the
accountable cost amount and, therefore, the FSP allotment
per pupil. As Figure 111-4 showed, increasing the FSP
extends more state aid to more districts without compro-
mising the equity of the system.
UNEQUALIZED LOCAL ENRICHMENT
Local enrichment is one of the least understood
and most frequently mi sinterpreted concepts in public school
finance. When districts raise more local money than re-
quired by their Local Fund Assignment requirement, the extra
money is called "enrichment." Small local share require-
ments result in large amounts of enrichment. When dis-
tricts, despite continuing pressure from local taxpayers,
raise large amounts of enrichment, it is a signal that the
estimate of the basic cost of education used in the Founda-
tion School Program is unrealistically low. The theory of
enrichment is that it represents discretionary enhancement
of local school programs. Theoretically, the capability to
enrich leads to the development of "lighthouse" districts
characterized by innovation and excellence, which "light the
educational path" for their less affluent neighbors. This
belief assumes that only money allows innovation, and that
poor school districts can follow the lead even though they
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may not have the resources to do so. The point is, affluent
districts can provide large amounts of enrichment to enhance
their programs, but the less affluent cannot, and must use
their "enrichment" to provide basic program. The justifica-
tions for enrichment are after-the-fact excuses for the
results of an unfair school finance system.
If the required local share the Local Fund As-
signment (LFA) —is close to the total amount that dis-
tricts actually raise, the amount of unequalized local en-
richment decreases, and the distribution of state aid be-
comes more efficient. Having less enrichment does not mean
that districts have less money. It means only that the
amounts that districts raise are counted for the purpose of
calculating state aid. When the local share requirement,
the LFA, falls below the district’s true local revenues, the
amount of unequalized local enrichment increases, and the
state aid system becomes less efficient and less fair.
FOUNDATION PROGRAMS IN GENERAL
The first equalizing foundation program was de-
scribed by Strayer and Haig in 1923.
11
The core concept is
that. if the state and the local school districts are to
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share the cost of education, equity of taxation and educa-
tion can be achieved if the local share of the basic cost of
education is proportional to the revenue capacity of the
local district. This model has been influential to the
development of school finance plans in Texas. Strayer and
Haig’s model was expanded first by Paul R. Mort and later by
L.D. Haskew and Edgar Morphet. Billy Walker, author of The
Basics of Texas Public School EiD®D£e outlined the follow-
ing principles of the foundation program as they were final-
12
ly developed :
1. A foundation program should ensure an adequate, minimum
educational program for all children.
As this report shows, the concept of a minimum program does
not address the problems in inequity in taxation and educa-
tion.
2. Each local school district should be required to levy a
minimum tax rate. This levy becomes the local share of
the -Foundation program. The local share requirement
should be low so that all districts can participate.
Texas does not require districts to levy their local share.
The local share is computed in order to allow calculation of
the state share. This achieves the same purpose as Strayer
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and Haig’s principle without the disadvantages of a low
local share. In Texas terminology the local share require-
ment is the Local Fund Assignment.
3. The amount of equalization that the program provides
should be limited. Districts should retain the ability
to enricft their programs above the state minimum.
This report argues that this principle is neither rational
nor productive.
4. The program should promote local initiative and effi-
ciency.
5. The requirements and benefits of the program should
apply equally to.all school districts. To ensure uni-
formity, as much of the program as possible should be
in law rather than administrative rules or at adminis-
trative discretion.
&« The -Foundation program should include as much o-F the
state’s total educational funding as possible. Per
capita grants and categorical grants which are not
contingent on district tax capacity reduce the equali-
zing effect of state funding.
Texas has included within the Foundation Program most of
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its categorical grants. The remaining state aid which is
outside the equalizing Foundation School Program are the the
transition funds of H.B. 72, the state teacher retirement
contribution, and textbooks.
7. The state should institute uniform property assessment,
since the foundation program concept bases the local
share on local tax capacity.
Failure to mandate uniform assessment practices led to the
cumbersome County Economic Index of the Gilmer—Aikin Laws.
When the state attempted to use market values as the gauge
of revenue capacity without mandating uniform assessment (in
1975), districts lowered their assessment ratios to capture
state aid. The state was forced to establish the State
Property Tax Board (its current name) to oversee local
practices. In 1979, the legislature mandated uniform as-
sessment practices in Senate Bill 621.
8. The foundation program structure should promote consol-
idation of small, inefficient school districts where
practi cal.
Before the Gilmer—Aikin Laws, Texas had approxi-
mately 5,000 school districts for just over one million
pupils-
1
" The current number stands at just over 1,000
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districts for about 2.8 million pupils. That number con-
tinues to include tax avoidance districts, segregation dis-
tricts and small, adjacent districts separated by athletic
rivalries. The push for consolidation has eased since the
state has accomplished it to a large degree.
BASIC MECHANISMS FOR FOUNDATION PROGRAMS
There are five basic mechanisms under which foun-
dation programs can operate. The earliest was per capita
distribution of state aid, advocated by Culbertson in
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1903. Per capita distribution does not address the prob-
lem of equalization since schools receive aid regardless of
their revenue capacity. The Available School Fund is an
example of a residual per capita program in Texas.
The Strayer and Haig model is an example o-F the
anit grant- system. The unit system -Follows four steps:
1) The state determines the basic cost per pupil -For
a minimum education.
2) The state estimates the tax rate that the wealth-
iest district in the state would need in order to
raise the basic cost.
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3) All districts in the state are required to levy
the minimum tax rate determined in 2.
4) The state provides each district with the differ-
ence between the basic cost and the revenue gener—
ated by the minimum tax rate on the individual
district’s tax base.
The Strayer and Haig model has three problems.
First, the tax rate needed by the wealthiest district to
raise the basic cost may be so low that the minimum state-
wide rate is too low to be realistic. This is the case in
Texas. The wealthiest district can raise $3,000 on a 2 1/2
cent tax rate. Since the average tax rate in Texas is near
58 cents, a program based on a 2 1/2 cent rate will not
reflect the actual amounts raised locally for education.
Second, wealthy districts have sufficient remaining capacity
to reduce or eliminate any equalizing effect. This model
distributes state aid to districts with generous tax bases.
Given that state resources are limited, the amount of aid
distributed to the less wealthy districts necessarily is
reduced. Third, estimation of the basic cost is critical to
the success of the program. If the legislature is not
sufficiently responsive to changes in the basic costs, ap-
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propriations will fall behind real-world costs.
Harlan P. Undegraff devised the percentage equal -
17
izing plan in 1930. Percentage equalization does not use
the first step recommended by Strayer and Haig. That is,
there is no state estimate of basic costs. The percentage
equalization steps are: 1) Each district sets its own level
of spending. 2) The state pays each district a percentage
of the district’s spending based on the district’s relative
weal th.
The first objection to this form of percentage
equalization is that districts can bid up the cost of educa-
tion in anticipation of receiving state aid. Second, the
model does not provide guidance as to the importance of
district wealth to the percentage of the state’s obligation,
that is, to the equalizing effect of the program. Percentage
equalization has been modified in light of these problems,
and has proved to be a durable plan.
Guaranteed tax base plans are of more recent vin-
tage. There are several versions, but the basic steps are
similar to the Strayer and Haig model: 1) The state deter-
mines the basic cost. 2) The state estimates the tax rate
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that the average district needs in order to cover the basic
cost with standard property valuation. 3) If any district
must have a tax rate above the rate required by the average
district to raise the basic cost, it receives state aid to
cover the difference between its revenue on its tax base at
18
the average rate and the average district’s revenue.
Problems with this simplified version of the
guaranteed tax base plan are: 1) It equalizes poor dis-
tricts to the level of average districts and assumes that
the average district’s revenues are adequate. 2) The rate
needed on the average district’s tax base to raise the basic
cost may be prohibitively high. In other words, the average
district may not be able to provide a minimum quality educa-
tion. 3> Wealthy districts retain the ability to enrich
their programs far above the capabilities of the average and
below-average districts.
Power equalizing plans are similar to guaranteed
tax base plans, but apply the local tax rate to some pre-
determined tax base, such as the state-wide valuation of
taxable property per pupil. A district’s actual aid is
determined by the proportion o-F the state’s total property
value held by the district and the total amount of money the
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state has to spend.
Power equalizing plans emphasize local tax de-
cisions, and merely provide a mechanism by which all dis-
tricts, to a point, may exercise the same amount of control
over local education funding as any other district. These
plans make no judgement about the basic costs of education.
For that reason, power equalizing alone would not permit
Texas to fulfill its constitutional and statutory mandates.
ADDITIONAL EQUALIZATION AID
Since 1975, Texas has had some form of equaliza-
tion aid above the basic Foundation School Program. The
theory behind additional equalization is that it gives poor
school districts the opportunity to enrich their programs
just as wealthy districts may enrich from their own
resources.
There are several problems with the concept of
additional equalization. First, it obscures the need to
have an adequate Foundation School Program. As this report
shows, an FSP which accounts for all of the basic costs of
education will produce full equality when combined with an
adequate local fund assignment. With a small FSP, poor
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districts need equalization aid merely to make ends meet
let alone to provide enrichment. Second, the equalization
grants have seldom been adequate to make up for the large
disparities among districts. Distribution formulas for
equalization aid have assumed that only districts of below-
average wealth need additional aid. That assumes that dis-
tricts moderately above average do not need any aid to bring
their enrichment capabilities in line with wealthier school
districts. In short, equalization aid is a bone thrown to
the poorer districts which does not solve the problem of
wealth disparities. The solution to the equalization prob-
lem is an adequate FSP. This does not mean, however, that
the state should eliminate equalization aid. Equalization
Is unnecessary only when the Foundation School EcqqEam is
truly Whenever the legislature fails to fund the
FSP adequately, equalization aid is vital to prevent poor
school districts from being underfunded.
SUMMARY
Each of the foundation models presented above is
the product of a particular time and place, and is appro-
priate to its context. Culbertson’s per capita distribution
of state aid may seem simplistic and counter-productive in
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light of today’s wide variations in wealth between school
districts. In 1903, the tax base was primarily agricultur-
al
. Oil, industrialization, and urbanization had not yet
created great wealth disparities. In that context,
Culbertson’s plan was practical and realistic. Each of the
plans described is or was practical and realistic for its
context. The purpose of this report is to describe a plan
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This chapter reviews the statutory and
constitutional mandates which apply to school finance
in Texas, and discusses them in light of the basic
principles of justice. It presents basic principles of
equitable school finance derived from the statutes and
the constitution. It then presents a normative model
of school finance which complies, as far as practical,
with the principles presented.
Utilitarian Justification for Equitable School Financing
Why should school financing be equitable? There
are two answers, one utilitarian, the other normative. The
utilitarian answer has several facets which appeal to simple
practicality and/or self interest:
1. Ail citizens suffer when educational opportunity is
denied any group of pupils within the state. Such
pupils are less suited for professional, technical or
vocational employment, and Texas’ high rate of in—state
migration means that inadequately educated pupils of
one district will have an effect
on the unemployment
rates, crime, and social problems of other
districts-
The state of Texas, as a whole, loses the contributions
of potentially inventive and productive
citizens.
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2. An equitable system would protect school districts and
their pupils from the vagaries of local economic condi-
tions. Major industries may move or close, oil prices
may fall, and today’s wealthy district may be impover-
ished tomorrow. In the long term no school. district
can afford to be confident, about continued local prgs-
As long as the school finance system fails to
meet the needs of the poorest district, every district
is in jeopardy.
3. The current system results in persons of equal property
wealth bearing unequal tax burdens as the result of
state policy. The state subsidizes low tax rates in
wealthy districts and creates high tax rates in average
and poor districts. To the extent that districts with
high tax burdens tend to be poor and tend, therefore,
to have less adequate schools, their residents tend to
suffer an additional burden of lowered real estate
values since their districts are less attractive to
potential residents and businesses. To the extent that
tax burdens and educational opportunity are unequal
among the state’s school districts, the locational
choices of Texas residents and businesses are reduced.
An equitable system of school finance would result in
more uniform tax burdens, and would relieve the econom-
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ic distortions which the current system fosters.
Normative Justification for Equitable School
Any mechanism of school finance should comply
with the State Constitution and Section 16.001 of the Texas
Education Code. To do less is to open the state to judicial
challenge. The more worthy reason to comply is that both
documents are accurate expressions of fundamental principles
of justice. It is fortunate that the framers of those
documents possessed the depth of perception that allowed
them to incorporate such basic principles into the founda-
tions of Texas government, since challenging an unjust con-
stitution would be legally and politically difficult.
The mandates of statutes and the Texas Constitu-
tion simplify the task of formulating a normative model for
public school finance in Texas. The Constitution establish-
es three principles:
1) The establishment and maintenance of free public
schools is the responsibility of the legislature.
2) The system should be "efficient."
0
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3) No individuals or class of individuals is entitled
to exclusive separate public emoluments.
The Texas Education Code expands these principles:
1) Each student "shall have access to programs and
services that are appropriate to his or her educa-
tional needs..."
2) The programs and services available to any student
must be "substantially equal to those available to
any similar student...."
3) "Varying local economic -Factors" shall have no
bearing on the programs and services provided to
any student.
'J
These legal and constitutional principles are
fundamental. They express basic ideas of justice, fairness,
and practical government. They are worth a closer look.
Investing the legislature with the ultimate re-
sponsibility for education is a statement o-F the priority o-F
education -For the -Framers o-F the Constitution. The section
begins, "The general diffusion of knowledge being essential
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to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the
pe0p1e...." [author’s emphasis! Yet, the writers did not go
on to invest the ultimate responsibility for education in
any local authority. Education was and is a statewide
issue. State mandated curriculum requirements and accredi-
tation standards are a reflection of the fact that education
is an eA'ternaJity; the effects of educational practices in
one district are felt in other districts, for good or ill.
In a strictly utilitarian sense, that is justification for
state responsibility local government should not control
services which are important to citizens outside their ju-
risdictions. The issue, however, goes beyond the utilitar—
i an.
The principle that all children in the state shall
have access to substantially equivalent educational opportu-
nities is stated negatively in the Constitution and posi-
tively in the statutes. The Constitution enjoins the grant-
ing of separate privileges to any person or group. 6 This
is the basic principle of justice. As Rawls puts it:
Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
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When the state enhances the educational opportun-
ity of one group of school children at the expense of an-
other group, it is in violation of both the Constitution and
the basic principle of justice. The state has done this
continually in the past, and continues to do so through such
mechanisms as unequal grants of tax capacity, unequalized
aid, and inefficient aid distribution formulas. These ac-
tions must be seen in their true light. Since the state’s
resources are limited, state aid to wealthy school districts
must reduce the funds available to less wealthy districts.
The issue extends to tax burdens. The state sub-
sidizes lower tax rates in wealthy districts by granting
them broader revenue opportunities than less affluent dis-
tricts. Further, the state provides funds which displace
local revenue needs and, therefore, taxes. The state active-
ly creates inequities in taxation.
The Texas Education Code mandates that all Texas
schoolchi Idren have equivalent educational opportunity.
Another basic principle of justice is that undeserved in-
p
equalities or accidents of birth must be compensated for.
A child’s residence in any particular school district (or
-Family) is surely an accident of birth. That a child who
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resides in an impoverished school district should be placed
at an educational disadvantage by the- state is clearly
unjust. Conversely, it is clearly unjust for the state to
enhance the educational opportunity of another child who by
accident of birth resides in a wealthy school district. The
principle of justice would mandate that the state compensate
for the poverty of the first child’s school district so that
his educational opportunity is equivalent to that of the
child in the wealthy district.
An extension of this principle is that the educa-
tion that children receive cannot be dependent upon the
willingness or unwillingness of the voters in their dis-
tricts to support education. The children have no choice or
control in the matter. Children should not be penalized for
the shortsightedness of their communities.
The Constitution mandates an "efficient" system.
Given the limitations on the resources of the state, an
efficient system is one which achieves the
educational goals
and conforms to the basic principles with the least waste.
State aid should be directed first to the points of greatest
need. The state’s practice of providing aid to school
districts with enough wealth to spend two and three times
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the average for total school district expenditures clearly
violates the mandate of efficiency.
PRINCIPLES OF AN EQUITABLE SCHOOL FINANCE MODEL
The following principles derive primarily from the
documents cited and are characteristic, in any case, of any
equitable system of state school aid. Additional comments
are provided when the derivation is not clear, has not been
discussed before, or is independent of the basic principles
or the documents.
1) ...each student enrolled in the public school system
shall have access to programs and services that are
...substantially equal to those available to any simi-
lar student-.... Texas Education Code, Section
16.001; Texas Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 3.
2) ...each student...shall have access to programs and
services that are appropriate to his or her educational
needs.... — Texas Education Code, Section 16.001
Since the state has the primary responsibility for
education, it is the responsibility of the state to deter-
mine the appropriate level of education, and to provide it.
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The adequacy and appropriateness of the education pro-
vided cannot depend on local economic factors.
Texas Constitution Art. 1, Sec. 3; Texas Education
Code, Section 16.001
This principle is the core of any just state aid
program. It mandates an equalizing state aid formula. To
understand this logic, it is necessary to understand that
local taxing authority is granted by the state. Texas
Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 3. The size of grants to in-
dividual school districts varies since local tax capacity
varies. If the state chooses to provide different grants of
revenue capacity, it must compensate for the differences
among those grants through other grants.
4) The adequacy and appropriateness of education should
not depend on the willingness of the voters in the
local school district to support taxes.
In this regard, the state should serve in a child-
protective capacity. There are two ways in which state aid
systems can violate this principle. a) Aid formulas which
reward local effort and penalize districts which do not
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expend the required effort punish the children, rather than
the unwilling taxpayers. b) Any aid system that does not
require a minimum local effort allows the local share of
school funding to be inadequate. This applies to any system
in which the state shares funding responsibility with local
districts.
5) The state should not use aid as an incentive for
districts to implement policy.
To withhold aid as a penalty -For non-compliance is
to penalize school chi Idren. On the other handy the no-lose
technique o-F granting aid to any district which complies
with a particular policy rewards districts which would com-
ply regardless. That is, the technique is inefficient.
Further, it is usually the wealthier districts which are in
compliance or which can achieve compliance more easily.
Therefore, incentive schemes tend to work counter to equal-
ization. The state has control options available to enforce
compliance, and should use them instead of monetary incen-
tives.
6) The aid system should allow the state to reduce its
reliance on the local property tax, and to shift to
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more equitable r statewide tax bases.
The local property tax is the source of the prob-
lems of inequity in school finance. Total replacement of
the local property tax for education would cost at least
-
9
$3.2 billion. Replacing a revenue source of that size may
not be practical at this time, but there are equitable
solutions which can reduce the importance of the property
tax in school funding.
7) State aid should account for the two types of basic
cost variations in education: the special needs of
special populations of pupils and cost factors related
to size and location of school districts.
Equivalent educational opportunity does not mean
that an equal amount of money should be spent on every
pupil. Special pupils have special educational needs and
higher costs. Special populations include special education
students, non—English speaking pupils and culturally handi-
capped students. The proportions of special populations
vary among school districts. The aid system should take
this variation into account.
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The other cost factors include locational factors
and economies of scale. Districts in competitive labor
markets must pay higher salaries to maintain quality teach-
ing staffs. Schools located in sparsely populated regions
have costs associated with their isolation and with econo-
mies of scale. Small schools are more expensive to operate
than large ones.
10
When the only option is to transport
pupils for unreasonable distances, aid to small schools in
sparsely settled regions is appropriate. See (8).
8) The state should not permit the continuance of school
districts below a reasonable size when options for
consolidation exist.
Texas has reduced the number of school districts
from 5,000 to 1,000 over the past 34 years. The state
continues, however, to subsidize the continuation of tax
havens, segregation havens and sports rivalries.
The aid system is not an appropriate mechanism for
consolidation since any aid penalty falls on the pupils.
School districts are the creatures of the state, and exist




9) The aid system should include classroom construction
aid within an equalizing system of state aid.
There is no equity in classroom construction in
Texas since Texas has no construction aid system to balance
the wide variations in local tax capacity. Poor school
districts are forced to reduce current service levels in
order to provide basic facilities. A system to meet the most
pressing classroom construction needs would help relieve
districts of the burden of choosing between adequate shelter
and adequate teachers.
10) The total system for state aid must be simple to
understand.
Complicated systems give control and power to the
few who understand them. An essential of democracy is that
issues which affect the public be accessable to the public.
Complicated school finance systems are not accessible to
legislators or the general public. This hampers democratic
decisionmaking, and increases the potential for abuse.
11) When possible, the system should be capable of being
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put in place through incremental adjustments to the
existing system.
The incremental approach prevents the wholesale
disruption and confusion that results from massive reform
efforts. Provided that the state has a workable system of
school finance, it should be used.
12) The systein should be sufficiently flexible that minor
adjustments can keep it in conformance with the basic
princi pies , as well as the state constitution and stat-
utes.
Texas now has a system which meets the basic re-
quirements -For the implementation of an equitable school
finance plan. The full assessment of property mandated by
S.B. 621 makes accurate allocation of state aid possible.
The state and local school district administrators are ex-
perienced in the foundation system of state aid. Texas has
over thirty years’ experience with equalizing aid formulas.
Finally, H.B. 72 of the Special Session of the 68th Legisla-
ture provides a basic structure for further reforms.
The next question is how to construct a model which
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complies with the principles just described. The model
described here will comply with the principle of incremental
change since the structure of school funding in Texas is
fundamentally sound.
DETAILS OF THE MODEL
Texas’ current foundation school program is a unit
cost model similar to the foundation program described by
Strayer and Haig. The advantages of the unit cost approach
include: 1. conformance with the constitutional mandate of
legislative responsibility; 2. greater efficiency and eco-
nomy; 3. effective control of costs; 4. consistency with
the current system. The normative model presented here is a
unit cost system. The normative model consists of the
following components:
1) The Allotment is the basic cost per Average
Daily Attendance. The basic allotment must be adjusted
■for special populations and special district character-
istics to produce each district’s FSP entitlement.
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2) The Local Share is based on a state/local share ratio.
The local share of the ratio is derived from and equi-
valent to the average local tax rate. The state share
is the balance derived by subtracting the local share
from the Foundation School Program entitlement.
3) Classroom construction aid brings the final major por-
tion of school finance into the equalized system. It
would provide need-based aid on an equalized formula
based on classroom unit costs.
4) Supplementary Equalization fiid identical to the current
enrichment equalization aid is necessary to ensure that
poor school districts do not suffer when the state
fails to fund the basic Foundation School Program ade-
quate! y.
Although the details of these components would be
more complex in practice, an equitable system of school
finance does not require great complexity. These four com-
ponents describe a complete and relatively equitable system
that is compatible with current practice. The discussion
that -follows deals with the details of the four components.
Figure IV-1 illustrates the model.
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Figure IV-1: The State Aid System Under the Normative Model
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BASIC ALLOTMENT
The basic allotment is the figure used in the basic
aid formula which indicates the amount of money allocated
per pupil. At minimum, it should be based on an ongoing
assessment of the basic accountable cost of an accredited
program. Since the costs of an accredited program may be
manipulated, and may not be an adequate reflection of true
costs, a more realistic method for determining the basic
allotment may be to develop an estimate of the normative
cost.
1 ’
The normative cost is the cost of the mix of educa-
tional offerings that most school districts consider to be
necessary. The normative educational program is more exten-
sive than the accredited program. For example, the accre-
dited program does not include computers, but classroom
computer utilization is becoming the norm. Therefore, the
normative cost of a basic, quality education would include
classroom computers.
The basic allotment represents the minimum size of the
Foundation School Program allotment to any school district.
As this report has shown, the basic allotment should be
large enough to account for all the basic costs for the
typical pupil. The allotment should be adjusted to account
for the special costs of educating pupils with special
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needs. The units in this unit cost system are the pupils,
or more precisely, the pupils in Average Daily Attendance.
Since the major cost of education is teacher salaries, the
cost per pupil reflects the student,'teacher ratio. Unit
cost models may be based on personnel units. In that case,
the number of personnel units a district receives is based
on the student/teacher ratio, also. Personnel unit systems
benefit wealthier schools since their extra wealth allows
them to hire teachers who rate higher in the pay scale, and
the system pays them for that. Districts with less wealth
are unable to hire the more expensive teachers, and there-
fore receive less state aid.
Calculation of the basic cost should take into
account the mix of pupils in the various grade levels,
pupi 1-teacher ratios mandated by the state, administrative
costs, transportation costs, and any other costs associated
with educating the "average" student in the typical dis-
trict. The basic allotment should be adjusted by several
factors for special circumstances to produce the ad justed
allotment which is the Foundation School Program amount for
each individual school district. Each district will have a
different Foundation School Program amount since each dis-
trict will have a different mix of pupils and special local
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circumstances. This is in accord with the mandate of the
Texas Education Code, Sec. 16.001 that each child shall have
an equivalent educational opportunity. Transportation
costs are a special case since mileage requirements vary
among districts. This report does not address the calcula-
tion of transportation aid, nor does it evaluate the state
transportation aid system. Regardless of the calculations
used to determine a district’s individual transportation
costs, those costs should be included in the state aid
formula so that state transportation aid is equalized as are
the other forms of state aid.
Special Popul at ion Adjustments. A part of cost
accounting is development of cost figures for specific pupil
populations such as bilingual and disadvantaged pupils»
This should be part of the ongoing assessment, since the
costs associated with special populations may change at
different rates. Special population adjustments are an
overlay on top of the basic accountable costs, since the
basic accountable costs are estimates based on
the mix of
"regular" pupils.
Price Differential Index. Any particular dis
trict’s costs are influenced by factors that are beyond
the
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districts control. For example, if a district is in com-
petition with a high-paying professional labor market, it
will have to pay more for teachers or hire teachers who
cannot compete in the market. The price differential index
is an adjustment that accounts for costs that are beyond any
particular district’s control.
The PDI is mentioned here because it is a compo-
nent of H.B. 72 and has theoretical validity. In theory, it
costs more to provide a pupil in a high-cost district the
same of education as a pupil in a low-cost district.
The PDI complies with Section 16.001 of the Education Code
by adjusting for local economic factors that influence the
quality of education. For practical reasons, this report
argues against the immediate implementation of a PDI. The
PDI is developed through application of a complex economet-
ric model. That does not mean that the econometric model is
necessarily objective. The variables selected for inclusion
in the model are subject to manipulation for the benefit of
selected groups of schools. Since the model is not acces-
sible to a layman’s understanding, it invites abuse. The
need for simplicity indicates that adjustments for loca-
tional factors should be delayed until thoroughgoing assess-
ment is possible. A PDI should not be implemented if it
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becomes a political bargaining issue in Texas as it has in
14
the other states that have implemented it.
Small School and Sparsity Adjustments. Small
schools have higher per-pupil costs because of poor econo-
mies of scale. Schools located in sparsely settled regions
of the state have little opportunity for consolidation.
Frequently, they are small districts due to the sparsity of
settlement, and have special costs associated with their
isolation. A sparsity adjustment is not a small school
adjustment. It allows a larger allocation for schools that
have special costs associated with their location in
sparsely populated areas. There is a dilemma in providing
special adjustments for small districts that do not qualify
as sparsely settled, since such districts tend to be tax and
segregation havens. On the other hand, failure to provide
additional money to small schools, regardless of their rea-
sons for existence, penalizes the pupils of those districts.
According to the principle that the state should not use
economic sanctions to enforce conformance with policy, small
schools should receive adjustments. This should be accom-
panied, however, by legal action to force consolidation.
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A GRAPHIC REVIEW OF THE MECHANICS OF THE FSP
There are three ways to determine the local share
and allotment size for an efficient foundation program.
Before exploring that, a short review of the
mechanics of foundation programs is in order. Figure IV-2
shows revenue capacity per student as school district wealth
increases against an overlay of state aid granted on a plan
that balances revenue capacity. State aid exactly compen-
sates for inadequate local revenue capacity up to point A.
Above point A, district revenue capacity exceeds the size of
the basic program, and districts above point A can enrich
above the basic program with lower than average tax rates.
As long as the Foundation School Program actually covers the
cost of education, then the districts below point A can
provide an adequate education.
Figure IV-3 shows that when the FSP funding level
per pupil increases, the equalized region increases. The
FSP level is the adjusted allotment of the FSP which should
reflect the true, accountable costs that districts bear.
The larger FSP allotment reflects a higher basic cost figure
which better represents the true costs. The larger a—-
mount increases the number of districts that receive state
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The figure shows local revenue capacity balanced by state aid.
To the left of point A, state aid exactly balances local capacity on
a uniform tax rate. All districts in that range have the same total
revenues, although the proportion of state to local revenue varies.
To the right of point A, districts receive no state aid. If these
districts levy the same tax rate as the districts below point A, they
can produce more revenue than districts below point A receive from
the combination of state and local sources. If they choose, the dis-
tricts above point A can have the same revenues with lower tax rates
than districts below point A.
Source: Author's cal cul ations. from concept developed by Craig Foster,
Director, The Public Education Resource Equity Center, Austin.
Figure IV-2
Balancing Local Revenue Capacity With State Aid
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When the amount of aid per pupil provided by the Foundation
School Program increases, the number of districts that qualify for
aid increases, since the revenue capacity needed to match the FSP
amount is larger than before.
Source: Author’s calculations
Figure IV-3
The Effect of the Foundation School Program Funding Level
On the Number of Districts Receiving Aid
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aid. This is logical, since fewer districts can support the
larger program with an average tax rate.
Figures IV-2 and IV-3 illustrate the first way to
determine the structure of a foundation program. An equit-
able foundation program would exactly balance local revenue
capacity. The Local Fund Assignment, therefore, would be
near the average tax effort. As long as the adjusted allot-
ments of the foundation program matched the true cost of
education for the districts, the program would be efficient
and equitable.
The second way to set up the model is to decide
1) how much money the state has to spend, 2) how many school
districts must receive state aid for the plan to be politi-
cally viable, and 3) adjust the basic cost and local share
so that the state’s obligation fits within its spending
limits. This was the procedure followed in the formulation
of H.B. 72.
15
The result is illustrated by Figure IV-4.
The total revenue available to less affluent districts is
less than that available to wealthier districts that, never-
theless, receive state aid.
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This figure is a schematic representation of the result of in-
cluding more districts in the distribution of state aid. The compromise
distribution’includes districts at the wealthier end of the scale by re-
ducing the amount of aid to the poorer districts. If the state had un-
limited resources, it could equalize across the entire wealth range. With
a limit on spending, however, the state has two choices: 1) It can equal-
ize across as much of the wealth range as its resources allow. 2) It may
take from the poorer districts to provide aid to the additional dis-
tricts. S.B. 4 produced a distribution similar to the equalized line.
The compromise line is similar to the Foundation School Program distribu-
tion under H.B. 72. H.B. 72 provides some additional equalization aid
which gives a flat, equalized distribution of aid over a small portion of
the range. See Figure 111-6. The effects of H.B. 72, S.B. 4, and the
State Board's version of the old school finance system appear in Tables
V-2, V-3, and V-4. By the author.
Figure IV-4
Increasing the Number of Recipient Districts
Without Increasing the State's Expenditures
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The third method is to determine how much the
state is able to spend? and see how far it will go when
local capacity is balanced exactly? as shown in Figure IV-2.
In this case? the accountable cost is irrelevant? since the
amount of the adjusted allotment is determined, not by real
costs? but by the state’s willingness to support the pro-
gram. This process may result in overspending? but it is
more likely to result in inadequate spending if there are
other pressing claims on the state’s revenues? since there
is no attempt to determine the basic cost of education.
It should be obvious that the -First method is
preferable and that the others are compromises of that
method. The first method complies with Article 7, Sec. 1 of
the Texas Constitution because it ensures that all Texas
school children will have a basic education. The other
methods do not. Second, it ensures that the state’s educa-
tion spending will go to the areas of greatest need.
Final-
ly? it is a straightforward? defensible procedure. It
would
ensure that the districts without adequate revenue capacity
could afford to provide the basic education? but would not
do great violence to the current convention of allowing
dis-
tricts to utilize their excess revenue capacity.
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DETERMINING THE LOCAL SHARE
The term "local share" refers to two very differ-
ent things. The local share of the Foundation School Pro-
gram is the amount calculated in order to determine the
amount of state aid a district is entitled to. The proper
term for this version of the local share is the "local fund
assignment." The true local share is the real portion of a
district’s total. spending that the district provides from
its own resources. The state share of the Foundation School
Program covered about one-half the average cost of maint-
enance and operations per pupil in 1984. The remaining
portion, as well as the Local Fund Assignment, make up the
true local share. This is illustrated by Figure 111-2.
The Gilmer—Aikin Committee in 1949, recommended
that the local fund assignment be 20—25 percent of the
Foundation Program. By 1984, the Local Fund Assignment was
11.5 percent, but the true local share of total_ school
spending was about 50 There are two reasons for
this. First, the legislature had reduced the local fund
assignment several times. Second, the size of the
Founda-
tion School Program had not increased as quickly as
school
costs, so the FSP became a small part of total school
fund-
ing. As a result of the state’s unwillingness to fund the
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program adequately, districts and local taxpayers were forc-
ed to bear an increasingly greater share of the burden.
Simultaneously, the equalizing tendency of the Foundation
Program was reduced.
The following example illustrates the concept of
the true local share. If a district spent $2,700 per pupil
from all sources in 1983-84 and the state and federal
governments provided $1,600, the true local share was $l,lOO
18
or 40 percent of maintenance and operation. If debt
service is included, an average district’s true local share
of total school costs was 51 percent. The Foundation School
Program included both the state share and the Local Fund
Assignment. The FSP accounted for about $1,500 or 55 per-
cent of the maintenance and operations and 45 percent if
19
debt service is included.
These figures have two implications. First, the
Foundation Program was too small only 55 percent of
operations costs and 45 percent of total costs. It did not
represent the level of education that the majority of Texas
communities considered necessary, so districts were forced
to "enrich" to provide an adequate education. Second, the
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tax effort that most communities were willing to make was
greater than the effort required to raise the Local Fund
Assignment of the Foundation Program.
The Local Fund Assignment of the Foundation Pro-
gram has been a continuing controversy. Advocates for local
property tax relief push to reduce the Local Fund Assignment
in the mistaken belief that this will ease local tax pres-
sures. When the size of the Foundation Program decreases
relative to true costs, however, local property taxes must
increase to cover the balance needed to provide an adequate
education regardless of the LFA. Lowering the local fund
assignment means that state aid is distributed more widely
and, if total state expenditures are not increased propor-
tionately, the basic Foundation School Program amount must
be reduced. Either effort reduces the equalizing effect of
the program. Further, less affluent districts cannot
cover
the balance without greatly increasing taxes on their inade-
quate tax bases. Therefore, reducing the Local Fund Assign-
ment is less effective than increasing the Foundation School
Program for reducing local property taxes.
The conclusion to be drawn here is
that the local
fund assignment should reflect the tax effort
that districts
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actually make. If local property tax relief is a worthy
goal, it should be accomplished not by reducing the local
fund assignment, but by increasing the size and scope of the
Foundation School Program. For example, in 1983-84, the
local fund assignment was 11 cents per SIOO valuation. On
the average tax base, that tax produced about S2OO. State
aid provided about $1,300. The federal government provided
about S3OO. The district raised the Local Fund Assignment
of about S2OO and the balance of its needs for a total true
local share of about The average tax rate for
maintenance and operations was 58 cents in that period.
Had the Local Fund Assignment been set at 50 cents per SIOO
valuation, the local fund assignment for the average dis-
trict would have been about S9OO, which is less than the
district’s actual local revenues. If the Foundation Pro-
gram allotment had been $2,400, reflecting the average cost
of education minus the federal contribution for this average
district, state aid would have increased to about $1,500
from $1,300. State aid would have displaced about S2OO in
local taxes per pupil, or the average district would
have
had S2OO more per pupil to spend for education.
That addi
tional S2OO per pupil represents increased state spending
and, therefore, state taxes.
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PERCENTAGE V. TAX RATE LOCAL FUND ASSIGNMENT
From 1950 to 1984, Texas based the Local Fund
Assignment on a tax rate applied to each district’s tax
base. House Bill 72 made the LFA a varying percentage of
the Foundation School Program allotment. In one sense,
these two techniques are merely two sides of the same coin.
The percentage LFA determines a tax rate, and the tax rate
LFA determines the percentage. There are political and
practical reasons, however, -For choosing one or the other.
The tax rate LFA has no permanence when local property
values are in a state of change. The state/local share
fluctuates widely, as the examples cited have shown. Since
the state/local share ratio determines both the efficiency
and equalizing effects of the state aid system, this fluc-
tuation in the ratio makes the system unpredictable. The
percentage LFA accurately reflects the state/local share
ratio as property values change. The state/local
ratio
implies a tax rate. The implied rate of H.B. 72 was 27
cents per $lOO valuation for the average
district.
The tax rate LFA seems easy to talk
about and to
understand. Unfortunately, it is also easy to misunder-
stand. The most common misunderstanding is that
it is a
state mandated tax rate. Since H.B. 72 does
not require a
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district to raise its LFA, that contention is clearly false.
The basic principles of the normative model require that the
LFA be mandated, but at this time it is not. Because of
this common misconception, the legislature is under pressure
to lower the LFA, and it has done so in every session since
1975. (See Chapter II.) The consequences of lowering the
LFA are less efficiency, less equalization, greater cost to
the state, and, potentially, higher local tax rates. (See
Chapter III.) The common misunderstanding and political
abuse of the tax rate LFA, as well as the fact that all this
tends to drive the LFA downward, argue for the percentage
LFA.
CLASSROOM CONSTRUCTION AID
There are two justifications for classroom con-
struction aid. First, H.B. 72 mandates lower class sizes.
Therefore, it mandates that districts provide more class-
rooms. There is, however, no systematic effort to assess
the impact of this mandate on school districts, nor does the
state provide any aid to offset the local economic impact
of
the mandate. Second, districts with small tax bases are
forced to pay for classroom construction by reducing
mainte-
nance and operation tax rates. Although it is not
techni
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cally accurate, it is essentially accurate to say that poor
districts must pay for classrooms with money that they
otherwise would use for maintenance and operations. There-
fore, classroom construction aid would have a positive
impact on current operating costs. This report has shown
that a realistic Foundation School Program —one which ac-
counts for all of the requirements of a quality education
will produce efficiency and equity. Classroom construction
is part of the basic cost of education. Therefore, it
should be included in the state aid system. The program is
called clsssroon construction aid here, because a program
which targets classrooms addresses the real concern that
state aid should be used only to remedy the most pressing
and relevant education need, not to provide extraneous
facili ti es.
Classroom construction aid should not be included
in the maintenance and operations portion of the Foundation
School Program. Maintenance and operations funds pay for on-
going expenses, but any district’s classroom needs depend
on
its existing facilities and pupil population growth,
and
construction is a one-time expenditure for any particular
unit of need. Therefore, classroom construction aid
should
be a separate program with the following components.
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1) Classroom Construction Cost Assassmant
The state would conduct an ongoing assessment of class-
room construction costs to develop realistic figures
for the cost per classroom of the several options
available for new classrooms: temporary structures,
expansion or renovation of existing facilities, and new
facilities of various types. These figures would be
analogous to the Foundation School Program allotment
per pupi 1.
2) Naad Assassmant, Application r and Approval
Eligibility would depend on an application and approval
process to confirm the need of a district for addition-
al classrooms and the options that are appropriate for
the district temporary classrooms, new, permanent
classrooms, or renovation of existing facilities.
3) Equalizad classroom construction aid
The amount of classroom construction aid per classroom
unit would depend on the wealth of the district, and
would vary from 100 percent to none, just as state
aid
in the Foundation School Program varies.
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SUPPLEMENTAL EQUALIZATION AID
In a perfect world, additional equalization aid
would be unnecessary? the adequate FSP and fair local share
would balance local revenue capacity perfectly so that poor
school districts would be able to provide adequate educa-
tions. Unfortunately, there is no assurance that those
necessary conditions will be met at all times, even with the
best efforts of the state. And the state’s best efforts
have been inadequate in the past. Equalization aid would
protect helpless school districts from such contingencies.
EVALUATION OF THE MODEL
The normative model presented above has two prin-
cipal deficiencies which become clear when the model is
compared to the following basic principles:
adequacy and sppropristeness of education cannot
depend on local economic factors.
The adequacy and appropriateness of education should
not depend on the willingness of the voters in the
local school district to support taxes.
The first deficiency is that the model would
continue to allow districts to underfund education. The
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remedy would be for the state to require districts to levy
the tax rate needed to raise their Local Fund Assignments.
Politically, such a requirement does not seem advisable.
The second problem with the model is that it would allow
budget balanced districts those which do not receive
state aid under the Foundation School Program to enrich
above the level of the schools which receive state aid. Any
district which is willing to have a higher-than-average tax
rate would be capable of providing additional program, and
the wealthier districts would be more capable of doing so
than the poorer districts.
There are several possible solutions to this prob-
lem. The state could limit the tax rate of school dis-
tricts. This would place all pupils on equal footing, but
it would not solve the enrichment problem. For example, if
the 1985 average tax rate were
established as the limit,
there would continue to be districts with large revenue
capacity which would be able to provide generous programs,
lower tax rates, or both.
The state could “capture" excess revenue capacity
by requiring districts which produce an excess at the aver-
age tax rate to contribute
their excess to the state educa-
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tion fund. This method is used in California.
20
It does
not seem likely that such a "Robin Hood" plan would be
politically feasible in Texas.
The state could reinstitute the state ad valorem
education tax, and deny school districts the authority to
levy taxes. In this case, the proceeds of the tax would go
directly to the state education fund. This approach is
similar to H.B. 33 introduced by Representative Vowell in
the 1984 Special Session.lt differs from H.B. 33 in that
districts would not have the authority to levy any tax,
whereas H.B. 33 would have allowed them to continue to do
so. A state ad valorem tax would have the advantage of
capturing the now unused revenue capacity of the wealthier
districts. Analysis of H.B. 33 indicated that a tax rate
of 45 cents per SIOO valuation would have produced the same
total revenue as the average rate of 58 cents per
SIOO
valuation produced in 1984. The plan would establish
horizontal equity in property taxation for schools, and
would eliminate the problem of equalization. It would lower
the property tax rates of the majority of Texans. The plan
is in compliance with the principle that the adequacy of
education should not depend on the willingness of the voters
in any particular district to support taxes. Finally., it
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would allow the state systematically to decrease its re-
liance on the local property tax, since the property tax
would be only one of the mix of taxes available to the
state to fund education.
The first major objection to the Vowell plan is
that it would allow no local control over revenues. Any
disagreements about the adequacy of educational funding
would have to be resolved in Austin. Local districts would
have no recourse if the state did not provide adequate
funding. This argument has only superficial validity. Only
the wealthier schools in the state now have any significant
control over their revenues. The poorer schools certainly
do not benefit from their privilege of exercising local
control over inadequate revenue bases. For the majority of
Texas schools, state school funding levels determine the
adequacy of education they can provide. The decision is
made in the statehouse even now. Local control is more an
emotional issue than a rational one. Districts have little
choice over the quality of teachers they hire, staffing
patterns, curriculum, or teacher pay. Their lack of control
is due to long-standing state regulations and lack of ade-
quate revenue capacity. In other words, only the wealthy
schools have real local control over revenue, and they lack
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control over the other major portion of their school opera-
tions. Nonetheless, the local control is such an emotional-
ly charged issue that it alone will probably prevent adop-
tion of a statewide ad valorem plan.
The second major objection to H.B. 33 relates to
the effects of the loss real or imagined —of local
control. Support for public schools in Texas comes from a
broad range of economic groups. In this state, the wealthy
do not automatical 1y send their children to private schools.
Full state funding might remove the last control that
wealthy schools and wealthy parents have over their school,
the option of funding the school lavishly and treating it as
if it were a private school. The equitable system of school
finance described in this report would not prevent that, but
full state funding would.
Within the limits of the possible, the normative
model achieves a high degree of equalization, and does not
vary radically -From current practice. Being an incremental
approach, it is more likely to be politically feasible than
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Chapter V
CRITIQUE OF HOUSE BILL 72
The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader
with House Bill 72, the education reform measure passed by
the 68th Legislature in the Special Session of 1984, and to
critique the bill in light of the normative model presented
in Chapter IV.
House Bill 72 is a complex bill which deals with
many education issues besides finance. Some of these issues
have a bearing on school -finance in that they mandate
changes in school operations. For example, the bill in-
cludes a lower pupil-teacher ratio, higher teacher salaries,
special tutoring for certain pupils, and a number of other
things which increase school costs. This report does not
address the issues which have indirect effects on school
costs. The purpose here is to critique the adequacy of the
direct finance provisions of H.B. 72 in achieving equivalent




THE FINANCE STRUCTURE OF H.B. 72
The finance provisions of H.B. 72 differ con-
siderably from the finance system the bill replaced. Table
ll—l allows comparison between the two systems.
THE FOUNDATION SCHOOL PROGRAM
H.B. 72 is a unit cost system in which the unit is
the pupil in average daily attendance. The system arrives
at a basic cost -Figure -For each school district which is the
Foundation School Program size for that particular district.
Then, a formula determines the district’s share of that
cost. In practice the system is more complicated. The
actual procedure is illustrated by Table V-l. The greater
part of the program are in-formal a funds. That is, they are
distributed according to an equalizing formula. They are
wealth-tested. The Foundation School Program is in-formal a.
Unequalized funds are distributed to districts without re-
gard to their ability to pay. These are textbook aid and
the state contribution to teacher retirement.
In H.B. 72, the Foundation School Program size is


































































































































The Finance Structure of H.B. 72
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Daily Attendance (ADA) in 1984-85 and $1,350 thereafter.
The average daily attendance of a district is adjusted
upward to reflect the extra costs associated with special
pupil populations. These adjustments include vocational,
compensatory, bilingual, handicapped, homebound, and other
special students. The basic allotment per adjusted ABA is
adjusted again by the price differential index to produce
the adjusted basic allotment per adjusted ADA. The purpose
of this adjustment is to compensate districts for uncontrol-
lable costs. To this preliminary amount are added any
adjustments for small or sparse districts, the Education
Improvement and Career Ladder Allotment, and the Transporta-
tion Allotment. All of these additions and adjustments
produce the Total Foundation School Program. The district’s
share of the FSP is the Local Fund Assignment (LFA), which
is subtracted from the district’s FSP amount to give the
Bas’ic State Aid Entitlement. The Experienced Teacher Allot-
ment is subjected to the same wealth test as the rest of the
state aid, but it is added at this point since it operates
under a formula that requires prior calculation of the LFA.
The Basic State Aid Entitlement, then, is the basis for
calculating the district’s Enrichment Equalization Entitle-
ment if the property wealth of the district is below aver-
age. If the district loses state aid from the prior aid
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system, it is entitled, also, to Equalization Transition fiid
through 1986-87. What the system accomplishes is this:
The basic allotment is a starting point that rep-
resents the basic cost of educating the typical pupil with
no unusual educational needs in a district with no unusual
cost factors. This number is adjusted upward to account for
unusual circumstances and special pupil populations.
Special population adjustments recognize that a
unit of education for special pupils is more expensive than
an equivalent unit for regular pupils.
The price differential index is the adjustment for
special district circumstances. Its primary purpose is to
allow districts in highly competitive labor markets to pay
competitive salaries.
The Education Improvement and Career Ladder Allot-
ment is not much more than an add-on to the basic allotment.
It seems that it had symbolic value in gaining the support
of teacher groups during the Special Session. What it means
is that the starting point for the adjusted basic allotment
is $1 j,390 for 1984-85 instead of $1,290.
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The finance system prior to H.B. 72 was based on a
unit cost of personnel units teachers instead of pu-
pils. The system was intended to made a district’s hiring
decisions neutral as to whether to hire an experienced or an
inexperienced teacher. It was feared that the pupil unit
system would penalize experienced teachers unless an incen-
tive were added to hire or retain them. The purpose of the
Experienced Teacher Allotment is to make district hiring
procedures neutral regarding a teacher’s experience.
The Enrich»ent Equalization Allotment provides an
additional grant to districts with below-average (below 110
percent of average) tax capacity. This grant helps to
compensate for the fact that poor districts cannot provide
any significant amount of program enrichment because of
their inadequate tax bases. As this report has pointed out,
the need for enrichment equalization arises when the FSP is
not large enough to cover the basic costs of education. One
of the main deficiencies is that classroom construction aid
is not part of the FSP. Enrichment equalization aid is a
surrogate for classroom construction aid since it helps
compensate poor districts with inadequate resources for the
large effort they must make to provide classrooms. For this
reason, H.B. 72 allows the enrichment equalization formula
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to be based on the district’s maintenance and operations tax
rate combined with its debt service rate.
The figure that results from all this adjustment
is the Foundation School Program amount for any particular
school district. Whether the basic allotment and the ad-
justments that produce the Foundation School Program amount
are adequate to provide a basic quality education is the
subject of a later discussion in this chapter. For the
program to be effective, the amount should be close to the
actual cost of poviding a basic quality education for the
particular children that make up a particular district. The
actual amount of state aid that the district will receive is
determined by the local fund assignment. A district of
average wealth is responsible for 30 percent of its Founda-
tion School Program amount <33 percent after 1984-85). The
percentage will be lower for a district with less property
wealth, and higher for a wealthier district. A district
with 330 percent or more of the statewide average wealth per
pupil will have a 100 percent LFA in 1984-85. Thereafter,
districts with 300 percent or more of the statewide average
wealth will have a 100 percent LFA.
The fact that a district has a 100 percent local
118
fund assignment does not mean that it will receive no state
aid. It means only that it will receive no aid within the
Foundation School Program distribution. Wealthy districts
will continue to receive state aid through the teacher
retirement system and textbook aid. These are unequalized
entitlements. The Equalization Transition Fund is a temp-
orary measure which provides additional aid to wealthy dis-
tricts, regardless of need. It is supposed to be phased out
by September 1, 1987. This measure is equivalent to the
hold-harmless provisions in the previous education finance
statutes. The transition fund is a part of the Foundation
Program formulas. The other grants are unequalized aid.
UNEQUALIZED STATE AID
The state pays the employer’s share of teacher
retirement. The amount that the state contributes for any
individual teacher depends on that teacher’s salary. Since
the teachers employed by wealthier districts tend to receive
higher salaries, and since the employer’s retirement contri-
bution is a perquisite that helps attract personnel, the
state’s policy of assuming full responsibility for the em-
ployer’s share of retirement contribution helps wealthy
districts hire and keep more experienced personnel than poor
districts. The state’s contribution to the teacher retire-
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ment system was $492 million in
The state purchases and maintains ownership of
textbooks. It distributes the textbooks to districts
according to pupil populations and categories. In 1983, the
State spent $5l million on this form of aid.
a~ There is no
wealth test in the provision of textbooks; districts receive
the books free, regardless of ability to pay.
EVALUATION OF
THE FINANCE STRUCTURE OF H.B. 72
Preliminary analysis o-f H.B. 72 indicated that it
achieved improvements in the equity of school finance. The
question is not whether the state should return to the pre-
existing system, but whether H.B. 72 went far enough in
correcting the injustices of school finance in Texas.
The normative model provides three basic ques-
tions to ask of H.B. 72: a) Is the Foundation School Pro-
gram created by H.B. 72 adequate in size and scope? A
subsidiary question is, does H.B. 72 include an adequate
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system for assessing the costs of education and incorpo-
rating the results in the basic allotment? b) Is the local
fund assignment adequate to provide an equitable and eco-
nomical distribution of state aid? c) Does there continue
to be unequalized state aid which compromises the efficien-
cy and equalizing tendencies of the state aid system?
Since quantitative analysis of a subject as com-
plex as school -finance requires an enormous, up-to-date data
base, a large computer, and considerable programming and
computer time, the quantitative comparison of H.B. 72 in
relation to the normative model will rely on analyses done
by the Texas Education Agency for Senate Bill 4, introduced
in the Special Session of 1984. S.B. 4 is in substantial
compliance with the Local Fund Assignment requirement of the
normative model. S.B. 4 does not, however, include
textbook
aid, the state’s contribution to teacher retirement, or
classroom construction aid in the Foundation
School Program.
Therefore, S.B. 4 is of smaller scope and size than
the
normative model. The results of S.B. 4 are sufficiently
different from those of H.b. 72 and the prior system
to




THE ADEQUACY OF THE FOUNDATION SCHOOL PROGRAM IN H.B. 72
There are two measures for the adequacy of the
FSP scope and size. The scope of the program refers to
the aspects of school finance included in it. The scope of
the program influences its size, but there are aspects of
the scope of the program which deserve separate treatment
because they influence the efficiency of the system of state
aid. Chapter 111 demonstrated that the size of the FSP is
critical to its ability to provide adequate equalization.
SCOPE
The Foundation School Program of H.B. 72 does not
include textbooks, teacher retirement, or classroom con-
struction. The provision of textbooks is equivalent to a
per capita grant similar to the Available School Fund. This
creates an equity problem since wealthy districts receive
free textbooks regardless of their ability to share the
purchase cost with the state. For the state to pay all of
the employer’s portion of teacher retirement creates the
same efficiency and equity problems. The problem is magni-
fied by the fact that wealthy schools have been able to pay-
larger salaries, so their teachers receive more state money-
on retirement than the lower-paid teachers of the poorer
districts. The result is that the state subsidizes a por-
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tion of the wealthy districts7 decision to pay higher sal-
aries. The state subsidizes the wealthy districts7 larger
benefits. This is not an argument against retired teachers
receiving their due. It is justification for including
teacher retirement within the Foundation formulas so that
wealthy districts begin to pay a portion of the retirement
contribution, commensurate with their ability to pay.
Classroom construction is a different problem.
The state provides no direct aid for classroom construction.
As Chapter IV explained, this means that no equity exists in
the provision of school facilities. The taxpayers in poor
districts must pay higher taxes for debt service, or the
students of poor districts must go to school in inadequate
facilities, or both. 624/en that the state grant of revenue
capacity to school districts is unequal, the state has
created the inequities. Inclusion of equalized classroom
construction aid in the state aid program would redress the
i nequiti es.
SIZE
The S.C.O.F'.E. committee recommended, originally,
that the basic allotment of the FSF should be $1,850, 43
percent larger than the basic allotment in H.B. 72. The
committee recommended that special population adjustments
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for compensatory and bilingual education be 0.3, SO percent
and 200 percent higher, respectively, than the same
adjustments in H.B. 72. An adjustment of 0.3 means that a
special pupil counts as 1.3 regular pupils. The size of the
committee’s recommendations was reduced to produce Senate
Bill 4." The basic allotment was reduced to $1,715 from
$1,950. The other factors remained virtually the same. The
cost of S.B. 4 over current law was estimated at $937 mi 1-
4
lion for 1994-95. The cost of H.B. 72 was estimated at $949
million, and the State Board of Education Plan, s9ll mil-
lion.
0
Although they are not strictly comparable, these
amounts indicate that S.B. 4 would not have been more expen-
sive than the other plans, despite its larger allotments and
adj ustments.
As this report has demonstrated, the size of the
Foundation School Program entitlement has important effects
on equalization and local taxes. The larger allotment and
adjustment sizes make the school finance program more equi-
table and reduces the tax burden on local taxpayers in most
districts. To the extent that the size of the Foundation
School Program allotments are lower than the real costs
which school districts must bear to provide a basic, quality
education, the program fails to equalize and forces local
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taxpayers to bear a higher burden.
THE SYSTEM FDR ESTIMATING TRUE COSTS
FOR THE BASIC ALLOTMENT
H.B. 72 requires the State Board of Education
(5.8.0.E.) to report biennially to the legislature on the
annual average accountable costs of a quality education.'
The bill requires the legislature,, however, merely to "con-
sider the recommendations." in setting the size of the basic
p
allotment and the adjustments to it. This soft language
allows the legislature to ignore the recommendations with
the result that education might be underfunded in the fu-
ture. The Price Differential Index, however, "shall be
adopted." Adoption of the PDI is the responsibility of the
5.8.0.E., not the legislature. The different treatment of
the Index may be traced to the maintenance of legislative
prerogative. The PDI, however, will have a profound effect
on the cost of public school finance to the state. That is
to say, the Index can have an undue effect on the appropria-
tion system. Yet, the PDI is less critical to adequate
school funding than adoption of an adequate accountable cost
figure. As Chapters 111 and IV argued, accurate estimation
of the true costs of education is fundamental to an adequate
education funding system. The fail are to provide for firm
acknowledgememt of the accountable costs of education is the
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single greatest failure of H.B, 72.
THE ADEQUACY OF THE LFA IN HB 72
The S.C.O.P.E. committee recommended a local fund
assignment of 40 percent of the Foundation School Program
amount of the average school district. H.B. 72 uses a LFA
of 30 percent for 1984-85 and 33 percent thereafter. This
report has shown that the smaller local fund assignment
means a less efficient distribution of state aid and less
equalization of school funding. See Chapters 111 and IV.
A factor in any consideration of the adequacy of
the LFA in H.B. 72 is the optional nature of the LFA. The
law does not require any district to raise its LFA. The
normative model stipulated that the education that pupils in
any district receive should not be dependent on the willing-
ness of the taxpayers in their district to support taxes.
Unless the LFA is mandatory there is no guarantee that the
pupils of any district will receive an adequate education.
UNEQUALIZED STATE AID IN H.B. 72
H.B. 72 retains the three ■forms of unequal ized
state aid already discussed under "SCOPE": unequalized
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state grants of tax capacity for construction, textbooks,
and the teacher retirement contribution. The last two items
alone represent approxi mately $550 million for 1984-85 dis-
tributed without regard to need. Textbook purchases cost ssl
million
1 *"*; Teacher Retirement cost $492 million in 1981-
11
82. To the extent that these funds go to school districts
which have the revenue capacity to raise these amounts with
a tax rate at or below the average, the state aid system
remains inefficient, tax burdens remain unequal, and school
funding remains inequitable.
THE RESULTS OF H.B. 72
Table V-2 shows the effect of H.B. 72 on different
wealth groupings. Column 1 shows total state aid per pupil,
not counting textbooks or state contributions to teacher
retirement. Column 2 shows each wealth group’s state aid as
a percentage of the average aid. Both of these columns
indicate that state aid increases as the wealth of the
district decreases, but the percentages in Column 2 allow
comparison of this table with Tables V-3 and V-4. The gross
amounts are misleading for purposes of comparison, and tend
to obscure the critical issue whether one plan achieves a
more equitable distribution of state aid than another. Col-
umn 3 shows total funding per pupil from both state and
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local sources assuming an average tax rate of 58 cents per
SIOO valuation, and not counting textbooks, state contribu-
tions to teacher retirement, or local taxes to retire debt.
Column 4 shows each group’s total state and local revenues
as a percentage of the average total revenues. Again, this
is the column to use when comparing the effects of H.B. 72
with the other plans. Total revenue is the proper gauge of
the equity of any finance plan since it accounts for the
state grant of tax capacity. When total revenue is taken
into account, the poorer and average districts are shown to
be in a less favorable position than wealthier districts
even though more state aid flows to the less affluent dis-
tricts.
Tables V-3 and V—4 show the effects of the State
Board of Education plan and Senate Bill 4, both of which
were presented to the legislature during the Special Session
of 1984. Columns 2 and 4 in the tables allow comparison
between the three plans. The 5.8.0.E. plan would have
produced the largest difference between rich and poor dis-
tricts, with the poor districts the losers. Under the
5.8.0.E. plan the poorest districts would have had 80 per-
cent of the average revenue, while the wealthiest districts
would have had 175 percent of the average. S.B. 4 would
have produced a distribution of total resources superior to
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both the 5.8.0.E. plan and H.B. 72. Under S.B. 4 ? the poor-
est districts would have had revenues equal to the average,
while the wealthiest districts would have had 157 percent of
the average. The middle group in the tables would have had 91
percent of the average under the 5.8.0.E. plan and 93 percent
under S.B. 4. Under H.B. 72, the poorest group would have
had S 9 percent of the average total revenue, the middle group
would have had 90 percent, and the wealthiest group 172
percent. These figures show that H.B. 72 is inferior to
5.8.4;, but represents an improvement in equity over the
previous school finance system as represented by the 5.8.0.E.
plan. The school finance system represented by S.B. 4 does
not include textbook aid, the state contribution to teacher
retirement, or classroom construction aid. As this report
has shown, the effectiveness of the Foundation School Pro-
gram, as well as the number of districts included in its aid
distribution, hinges on size and scope of the program. This
report has provided a conceptual framework which indicates
that inclusion of those additional forms of aid in the FSP
would result in a state aid program superior to both S.B. 4
and H.B. 72.
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Calculation of total state and local revenue uses
the median of each wealth range and a tax rate
of 58 cents
per $lOO valuation. For the poorest wealth range the low
figure used was $30,000, for a median of $56,500. For the
wealthiest range, the high figure used was $1,000,000. The
true high figure is $14,000,000, but the highest—weal
th
districts are excluded arbitrarily as unrepresentative.
Source: "Fiscal Impact Model, H.B. 72, Conference Committee

























$2,194.2 1417. $2,521.9 897.
S3,000—
107,999





1,930.2 1247. 2,634.9 937.
135,DOO-
176, 999
1,652.3 1067. 2,557.1 907.
177,000-
241,000
1,442.9 937. 2,657.9 947.
242,000—
430,999
1,129.4 737. 3,081.9 1097.
431,000
or Over
726. 0 477. 4,875.9 1727.
Average
220,209 1,555.6 1007. 2,832.8 1007.
Table V-2
The Effects of H.B. 72 by Wealth Groups
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Calculation of total state and local revenue uses
the median of each wealth range and a tax rate of 58 cents
per $lOO valuation. For the poorest wealth range the low
figure used was $30,000, for a median of $56,500. For the
wealthiest range, the high figure used was $1,000,000. The
true high figure is $14,000,000, but the highest—weal th
districts are excluded arbitrarily as unrepresentative.
Source: "Fiscal Impact Model, H.B. 72 Committee
























2,060.8 1257. 2,388.5 807.
83,000-
107,999
2,084. 1 1267. 2,638.0 887.
108,000-
134,999
1,983.3 1207. 2,688.0 907.
135,000-
176,999





1,600.8 977. 2,815.9 947.
242,000—
430.999
1,336.3 817. 3,288.0 1107.
431,000
or Over
1,075.3 657. 5 225.2 1757.
Average
230,681 1,652.6 1007. 2,990.5 1007.
Table 0-3
The Effects of the State Board of Education Plan
By Wealth Groups
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Calculation of total state and local revenue uses
the median of each wealth range and a tax rate of 58 cents
per $lOO valuation. For the poorest wealth range the low
figure used was $30,000, for a median of $56,500. For the
wealthiest range, the high figure used was $1,000,000. The
true high figure is $14,000,000, but the highest-wealth
districts are excluded arbitrarily as unrepresentative.
Source: "Fiscal Impact Model S.B. 4 Article II with




















$2,449.9 1617. $2,777.6 1007.
83,000-
107,999
2134.9 1407. 2,688.8 977.
108,000-
134,999
1,970.5 129% 2,675.2 967.
135,00O-
176,999
1,685.3 1117. 2,590.1 937.
177,000-
241,999
1,351.8 897. 2,566.9 927.
242,OOO—
430,999
927.6 617. 2,879.3 1047.
431,OOO—
or Over
219.5 147. 4,369.4 1577.
Average
216,207 1,523.4 1007. 2,777.0 1007.
Tabl_e V-4
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Fiscal impact models are rarely published. The results of
any particular model may vary from day to day since the
Texas Education Agency updates its data base continually.
Models of different proposals are strictly comparable only
when done with the same data, on a ‘'frozen" data base. The
calculations used in Tables V-2. V-3, and V-4 allow compari-
son between one aspect of the models, their relative equal-





This report has demonstrated that constitutional
and statutory mandates, as well as the basic principles of
justice, provide an effective standard by which to evaluate
public school finance in Texas. The school finance system
prior to H.B. 72 failed to comply with those standards but
had moved toward and retreated from them periodical Iy. H.B.
72 represents a significant improvement, but fails in sever-
al regards. This paper has dealt with the failings of the
finance portion of H.B. 72, and has discussed a number of
possible remedies. The recommendations which follow, how-
ever, are simple and of limited scope. The author does not
believe that major changes in the school finance system are
advisable at this time. For example, full state funding is
the ultimate answer to the problems of equity between school
districts and among property taxpayers. The political and
practical obstacles, however, to such a radical change in
the system seem too great, assuming that the change would be
desirable.
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SHORT STEPS TO EQUITABLE SCHOOL FINANCE
DO NOTHING
H.B. 72 created a new mix of winners and losers.
The losers will be active in attempting to persuade the
legislature to alter the system in their favor. It is
likely, for example, that schools which are receiving Equal-
ization Transition Aid will ask the legislature to make that
provision permanent. It is scheduled now to end in 1987.
This sort of extension was granted for the hoid-harmless
provisions of the previous finance system. The purpose of
the provision is to protect school districts which would
lose state aid or be forced to increase local taxes under
the new finance system. The majority of such districts have
over three times the average property wealth. That is, they
can have either three times the average revenue at the
average tax rate, or one—third the average tax rate at the
average revenue, or some compromise of the two. To be
blunt, the Equalization Transition Fund subsidizes low tax
rates in wealthy districts.
The Equalization Transition Fund extension is
only one example of the sort of measure that legislatures
have faced following the passage of school finance reforms.
The safest course for the legislature is to have a morato-
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rium on any changes until the latest reforms are well en-
trenched .
ENSURE THAT THE BASIC ALLOTMENT IS ADEQUATE
The failure of
not establish a firm commitment to fund the program ade-
guately. This report has shown that the size of the FSP
relative to the true costs of education is critical to the
operation of an effective school finance system. In the
terminology of the Education Code, the critical amount is
the Basic Allotment, since that figure is the major deter-
minant of the size of the Foundation SChool Program. To the
degree that the Basic Allotment is smaller than the actual
costs which school districts bear, the state funding system
will be inequitable and will force school districts to rely
more heavily on local property taxes. H.B. 72 requires the
Texas Education Agency to develop estimates of the account-
able cost of the accredited education so the legislature can
judge the adequacy of the basic allotment. T.E.A. has
expressed reluctance to develop the estimates. Sections
16.201, 16.202, and 16.203 of the Education Code should be
amended to ensure that T.E.A. develops adequate reports on
the accountable costs of the accredited program, and to
ensure that future legislatures give adequate consideration
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ELIMINATE UNEQUALIZED STATE AID
Unequalized forms of state aid such as the text-
book distribution system and the teacher retirement contri-
bution are sources of inefficiency in the state’s school
finance system. Inclusion of these forms of aid in the
Foundation School Program would save money and improve the
equity of the system.
to those costs in making appropri ations.
TIE THE LOCAL FUND ASSIGNMENT TO A REALISTIC LOCAL EFFORT
When the LFA is smaller than the average tax
rate, the distribution of state aid is inefficient, since
aid goes to school districts that have the ability to pay
for their programs. Lower LFAs result in larger state
obligations. An adequate LFA is a matter of efficiency and
economy. Whether the average tax rate is appropriate as the
LFA is open to question. Tying the LFA to the average tax
rate could have unexpected effects which this report has not
attempted to explore. The basic fact of the matter, how-
ever, is that the LFA should require close to the average
tax rate.
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include classroom construction in the state aid system
The legislature will probably face pressure dur-
ing the Regular Session of 1985 to soften the pupi 1-teacher
ratio or class size requirements imposed by H.B. 72. These
pressures arise from the fact that reduced class size re-
sults in higher costs for school districts which are not
already conforming to the new requirements. Average and
poor districts are less likely to be in conformance with the
mandate. The more stringent class size reguirements are an
example of a state regulation which results in higher costs
for school and especially for average and gogr
di.stri.cts. As this report has demonstrated, a state aid
system which fails to recognize the total, true costs which
local school districts face is less effective, less effi-
cient, and less equalizing. The state aid system under H.B.
72 attempts to provide an adequate amount of money for
teacher salaries to pay for the increased number of teachers
that the smaller class sizes will require. Unfortunately,
smaller classes require more classrooms, as well as teach-
ers. The problem goes beyond the temporary period of ad-
justment to the more stringent requirements; poor districts
long have been forced to reduce current service levels in
order to pay for capital construction. The program of
classroom construction aid described in this report would
help relieve both the temporary problem created by the new
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requirements and the chronic problem faced by the state’s
poor districts. By encompassing a large portion of school
costs, a classroom construction aid system would improve the
equity of the total school finance system. This report has
not attempted to estimate the cost of such a program to the
state. The system described included a need assessment and
the use of various options to reduce classroom construction
costs. The implication should be made clear: classroom
construction aid should be used to meet minimum, basic
facility needs. With that restriction, the cost to the
state should not be prohibitive. An additional benefit is
that the state taxes required to fund the program would
displace the local taxes that would otherwise be spent for
this purpose.
CONCLUSION
Major reforms are almost always controversial .
The education reforms of 1 954 were more controversial than
usual, perhaps due to the difficulty of understanding the
results, and certainly because of the number of vested
interests who insisted on disputing every facet of the
proposals. My role during the Special Session was to ana-
lyze the proposals, to evaluate the analyses of the propos-
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als provided by various agencies, and to advise a number of
state representatives. During that time, I came to the
conclusion that true reform of the state’s school finance
system could take place only if the mechanics of school
finance were made understandable. Making school finance
understandable was one goal of this report. The relative
simplicity of H.B. 72 made the task easier. The finance
system that proceeded H.B. 72 was considerably more complex.
I doubt that I would have attempted to clarify that system.
A major triumph of the Special Session was a school finance
structure that legislators, laymen, and school personnel can
understand. That means that the system will be easier to
supervise and control. It is not surprising that some of
the most vocal objections to the bill came from persons
whose livelihoods depend on their exclusive knowledge of the
workings of school finance in Texas.
This report has shown that the mechanics of the
Foundation School Program are relatively simple, and that
its broad effects are as predictable as gravity. The opera-
tive factors are the size of the adjusted FSP allotment
relative to the true cost of education and the Local Fund
Assignment relative to actual local revenues.
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There are several dangers for efficient, equita-
ble school finance in Texas. This report recommended that
rather than retreat from the reforms of H.B. 72, the legis-
lature would better serve the people of Texas by doing
nothing to the fundamental structure of H.B. 72. That is
the safest advice. The other recommendations would repre-
sent positive improvements, but opening the school finance
issue is laden with danger. Any close observer of the
Special Session of 1954 could see that trusted persons of
authority, as well as special interests, sought both to
cloud the finance reform issue and to mislead the legisla-
ture. It is a measure of the quality of leadership in the
legislature that those attempts largely failed. The special
interests which lost during the Special Session will be back
All that could damage school finance in Texas,
however, is not in education bills. There seems to be
considerable dissatisfaction with the property tax reforms
of 1979. As this report showed, uniform appraisal practices
and 100 percent appraisal are essential to the operation of
the Foundation School Program. Retreat from the property
tax reforms would virtually destroy the school finance sys-
tem by opening it to manipulation and subtrefuge, and conse-
quently, to inefficiency and inequity.
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H.B. 72 improved the fairness, the equity, and
the justice of school finance in Texas. This report has
argued that the bill did not go far enough. To overempha-
size that is to ignore one of the great triumphs of the
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